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Abstract 
Around the world, large corporations usually have controlling owners, who are usually very 
wealthy families.  Outside the U.S. and the U.K., pyramidal control structures, cross 
shareholding and super voting rights are common.  Using these devices, a family can control 
corporations without making a commensurate capital investment.  In many countries, such 
families end up controlling considerable proportions of their countries’ economies.  Three points 
emerge.  First, at the firm level, these ownership structures vest dominant control rights with 
families who often have little real capital invested – creating agency and entrenchment problem 
simultaneously.  In addition, controlling shareholders can divert corporate resources for private 
benefits using transactions within the pyramidal group.  The result is a poor utilization of 
resources.  At the economy level, extensive control of corporate assets by a few families distorts 
capital allocation and reduces the rate of innovation.  The result is an economy-wide 
misallocation of resources, and slower economic growth.  Second, political influence is plausibly 
related to what one controls, rather than what one owns.  The controlling owners of pyramids 
thus have greatly amplified political influence relative to their actual wealth.  They appear to 
influence the development of both public policy, such as property rights protection and 
enforcement, and institutions like capital markets.  We denote this phenomenon economic 
entrenchment.  Third, we conceive of a relationship between the distribution of corporate control 
and institutional development that generates and preserves economic entrenchment as one 
equilibrium; but not the only one.  Based on the literature, we identify key determinants of 
economic entrenchment.  We also identify many gaps where further work exploring the political 
economy importance of the distribution of corporate control is needed.  
 
I.   Introduction  
A growing body of work indicates that economic growth depends on the distribution of control 
over capital assets.  Two vast literatures, already surveyed in the Journal of Economic Literature, 
are relevant as points of departure.  The first, reviewed by Aghion, Caroli, and Garcia-Penalosa 
(1999), discusses reasons why economic inequality might impede growth.  The second, surveyed 
by Levine (1997), discusses the functional role of capital markets in stimulating growth.  We 
build on these insightful contributions by reviewing recent research that shows how the 
distribution of corporate control and the workings of capital markets are related, and how their 
interactions affect economic growth. 
For this purpose, the key insight in Aghion et al. (1999, p. 1621) is that perfect capital 
markets make wealth distribution irrelevant by allocating capital to each investment opportunity 
until its marginal return equals the market clearing equilibrium interest rate.  However, when 
capital markets are imperfect, inequality reduces investment opportunities, worsens borrowers’ 
incentives, and generates macro-economic volatility.  Simple capital market frictions can lead the 
wealthy to invest more than is the first best optimal, while the impecunious invest less.  
Assuming diminishing rates of return, redistributing wealth from the rich to the poor raises total 
output.  Such a redistribution, by fostering growth, also creates further investment opportunities 
for rich and poor alike.  Moral hazard problems associated with borrowing are also a feature of 
imperfect capital markets.  If wealth redistribution from rich to poor lessens the overall use of 
borrowing in the economy, these moral hazard problems ease, raising overall production and 
reducing the cost of debt financing on the margin (Aghion et al. p. 1626).     
 Levine (1997) surveys the second literature, on the functions of capital markets in 
economic growth – the organization of information acquisition, allocation of resources, 
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monitoring of managers, and exercise of corporate control.  To economize on information 
acquisition costs, financial intermediaries emerge that specialize in information acquisition, as in 
Diamond (1984) and Boyd and Presecott (1986).  If financial markets are large and liquid 
enough, and if investors’ property rights are sufficiently well protected, individuals expend 
resources to acquire information and conduct profitable informed risk arbitrage, as modeled by 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997), and this trading capitalizes 
information into stock prices (Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000)).  Roll (1988) argues that this 
mechanism is especially important for the timely updating of stock prices with new firm-specific 
information.  Stock prices that closely track fundamental values aid external financiers and 
corporate insiders in capital allocation decisions, simplify monitoring, and facilitate the design of 
credible incentive contracts that induce managers to keep faith with outside investors and 
maximize firm value.   
These two literatures converge on a central theme: economic growth requires that savings 
be directed into value creating investments.  Rajan and Zingales (2003), Durnev, Morck, and 
Yeung (2000, 2004), and others argue that capital markets are inimitably, though certainly not 
perfectly, effective in this regard.  This is because, by creating incentives for self-interested 
investors to gather and process information, as well as to monitor and control corporate 
managers, capital markets generate conditions amenable to efficient capital investment decisions.  
Directors of corporations needing outside capital must submit to this analysis, monitoring, and 
control by outside investors.  When official regulations, laws, and enforcement make outside 
investors sufficiently confident of their ability to undertake these tasks, outside investors hold 
equity.  Pooling their capital under the management of institutional investors allows small 
investors to attain economies of scale in accomplishing these tasks.  The resulting efficient 
financial market directs capital to its highest value uses – a situation Tobin (1982) defines as 
functional form stock market efficiency.  Note that functional form efficiency differs from the 
standard usage of the term market efficiency in the finance literature, which describes a situation 
where investors cannot obtain abnormal returns after transactions costs.  The two concepts are 
related, but not identical.       
Economists have little difficulty listing fracture points where actual capital markets fail to 
satisfy functional form efficiency.  The literature we survey below argues that the functional 
efficiency of capital markets depends on the distribution of corporate control in an economy.  In 
particular, this literature views economic growth as critically dependent on institutions that 
restrain entrenched elites, who could otherwise come to dominate the capital investment 
decisions of an economy.  This literature has its recent roots in corporate finance, perhaps 
because the extreme concentration of corporate control rights in the hands of tiny elites observed 
in many countries raises concerns about corporate governance in those economies.  The 
corporate finance literature also considers entrenched management to be a corporate governance 
issue at the firm level in ways that are helpful in understanding entrenched control in general.   
Our starting point is a curious empirical observation reported by Morck, Stangeland and 
Yeung (2000).  These authors divide up the world’s US dollar billionaires into two categories – 
self made billionaires and billionaire who inherited their wealth – and sum up the wealth owned 
by each category of billionaires in each country.  Unsurprisingly, they find that a country’s per 
capita GDP grows faster if its self-made billionaire wealth is larger as a fraction of GDP.  What 
is surprising is their result that per capita GDP growth is slower in countries where inherited 
billionaire wealth is larger as a fraction of GDP.   
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The literature we review below points to a set of possible explanations.  These 
explanations involve wealthy individuals who magnify their already substantial wealth into 
control over multiple corporations worth vastly more.  La Porta et al. (1999) show that this 
magnification is most commonly achieved using control pyramids:  structures in which a family 
firm controls several listed companies, each of which controls yet more listed companies, each of 
which controls yet more listed companies, and so on.  Family members are usually placed as 
executives of key firms throughout the structure.  Other less common devices also used to this 
end include superior voting shares and crossholdings.  Superior voting shares, distinct classes of 
stock with many more votes per share than ordinary common stock, allow insiders to control the 
majority of votes in shareholder meetings even though they own only a small fraction of the 
firm’s equity.  Crossholdings are structures in which firms own blocks of each others’ stocks.  
Since insiders vote these blocks, they exercise control beyond their actual ownership.  These 
sorts of structures can let a few wealthy families control in the greater part of a country’s large 
corporate sector.  They also leave the structure typical of large U.S. firms – stand alone firms 
with diffuse ownership and professional management – the rarest of curiosities in most of the 
rest of the world.   
This concentrated control can lead to corporate governance concerns – agency and 
entrenchment problems.  Entrusting the governance of huge slices of a country’s corporate sector 
to a tiny collection of elites can bias capital allocation to advantage those elites, and can also 
reduce the pace of innovation.  These effects, in turn, impede the development of capital 
markets, further distort capital allocation, and more generally retard growth.  In addition, to 
preserve their privileged positions under the status quo, the controlling elites arguably use their 
political connections to stymie the institutional development of capital markets and to erect a 
variety of entry barriers.   
Such an outcome is a suboptimal political economy equilibrium, which we dub economic 
entrenchment.  While wealthy established families are probably important to economic 
entrenchment in many countries, the problem is probably not restricted to countries whose 
corporate sectors are controlled by small cliques of extremely wealthy families.  Other sorts of 
elites can also become entrenched in positions of control over corporate assets and behave much 
like elite families, generating a similar outcome – functionally inefficient capital markets, high 
barriers to entry and a slow pace of innovation. 
The layout of this article is as follows.  First, we motivate this survey by discussing some 
empirical findings that suggest a link between economic growth and, not the concentration of 
wealth per se, but the “hands” in which control over corporate assets is concentrated.  Second, 
we review the literature on corporate ownership, pyramidal groups, and family control. This 
literature shows that many economies entrust the governance of large parts of their corporate 
sectors to tiny elites of extremely wealthy families.  Third, we discuss issues associated with 
such concentrated corporate governance, and how these might affect economic performance.  
Fourth, we evaluate the linkage between concentrated corporate control on the one hand and 
overall capital allocation, capital market development, creative destruction, and macroeconomic 
growth on the other.  Fifth, we discuss entrenchment as a political economy problem.  We 
discuss the determinants of economic entrenchment, which include investment opportunities, 
societal tradition, and initial endowments.  Also, we examine the relationship between economic 
entrenchment and openness.  Finally, we attempt to distill some general conclusions out of the 
above.   
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II.   Inherited Wealth and Growth – A Preliminary Reading 
Our starting point is a curious observation by Morck, Stangeland, and Yeung (2000).  Using 
Forbes’ listing of the one thousand wealthiest individuals in the world for 1993, and the brief 
biographies accompanying each, they distinguish new money billionaires, entrepreneurs who 
made their billions themselves, from old money billionaires, who inherited their wealth.  They 
gauge the importance of each type of billionaire in a given country by the sum of the wealth of 
that type of billionaire as a fraction of the country’s GDP.  When they regress real per capita 
GDP growth from 1994 to 1996 on these measures, controlling for initial per capita GDP, 
physical capital accumulation, and education levels, they find new money billionaire wealth to 
be associated with faster economic growth, but old money billionaire wealth to be associated 
with slower growth.  That is, in standard growth theory regressions of the sort used by Mankiw 
(1995), they report a highly significant relationship between growth and variables plausibly 
reflecting the distribution of control over an economy’s capital assets. 
 
Table 1 The Cross-Country Relationship Between Growth in Real Per Capita GDP 
and Capital Ownership, Controlling for Current per Capita Income, Capital 
Investment Rate, and Level of Education 
 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 
1.43 1.58 1.59 1.65 1.75 1.73 1.86 1.78 Intercept 
 (0.32) 
 
(0.30) (0.27) (0.28) (0.22) (0.26) (0.20) (0.25) 
-1.76 -1.77 -1.80 -1.79 -1.54 -1.66 -1.62 -1.69Log of per capita 
GDP:  ln(Y/L) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
0.21 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.17 0.20 0.18 0.20 Capital Accumulation 
Rate:  I/K (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
00.23 00.20 00.25 00.21 00.24 00.20 00.26 00.21 Average Total Years 
of Education:  ln(E) (0.27) 
 
(0.35) (0.23) (0.32) (0.24) (0.35) (0.21) (0.32) 
0.44 0.37 0.42 0.37 0.50 0.38 0.45 0.37Business Entrepreneur 
Billionaire Wealth Over 
GDP:  B/Y 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
-0.29 -0.17 -0.27 -0.16 -0.41 -0.19 -0.33 -0.17Heir Billionaire Wealth 
Over GDP:  H/Y (0.03) 
 
(0.10) (0.03) (0.09) (0.01) (0.09) (0.01) (0.08) 
Definition of  ‘heir’ a H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 H7 H8 
R squared 0.519 0.488 0.531 0.489 0.545 0.491 0.536 0.491 
Note: Numbers in parenthesis are two tailed t-test probability levels for rejecting a zero coefficient.  Coefficients in boldface are 
statistically significant at 90% confidence or more.  Sample of 39 countries consists of the countries listed in Table 1 minus the 
U.K. and U.S.  See Morck et al. (2000), Table 2 for further details.   
a H1 includes only the wealth of billionaires known positively to be heirs, politicians or politicians= relations.  H2 also includes the 
wealth of billionaires who are probably heirs.  H3 includes H1 plus fortunes jointly controlled by a founder and his heirs.  H4 
includes all the above.  H5 through H8 are analogous to H, H2, H3 and H4 but do not include politician billionaires and their 
relations.   
Table 1 recapitulates these results.  The alternative specifications shown treat wealth that 
is not unambiguously controlled by either a founder or an heir differently.  H1 includes only the 
wealth of billionaires who are unambiguously heirs, politicians or politicians’ relations.  H2 also 
includes the wealth of billionaires who are probably heirs.  H3 includes H1 plus fortunes jointly 
controlled by a founder and his heirs.  H4 includes all the above.  H5 through H8 are analogous to 
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H, H2, H3 and H4 but do not include politician billionaires and their relations.  The positive 
coefficients on new money billionaire wealth and the negative one on old money billionaire 
wealth remain highly significant across all the different specifications.   
Previous work, surveyed by Aghion et al. (1999) discusses the relationship between 
general inequality and growth, but Morck et al. (2000) add another twist – inequality involving 
new money wealth seems different from inequality involving old money wealth.  Perhaps 
economists need to think less about concentration of wealth per se and more about concentration 
of wealth in whose hands?  Why might inequality associated with inherited wealth be 
fundamentally different from inequality associated with entrepreneurial wealth?  To explore this, 
we must first examine how highly concentrated wealth can translate into even more highly 
concentrated corporate governance power.   
 
III.  The Ubiquity and Purpose of the Control Pyramid  
The extensive control wealthy families exert over the corporate sectors of most of the world’s 
economies depends on a particular ownership structure, the control pyramid, and other closely 
related structures.  While such structures are commonplace outside of the U.S., they were not 
well known in the academic literature until highlighted in recent work by La Porta et al. (1999).  
That research inspired further empirical work confirming that (i) most large corporations around 
the world have controlling owners, and (ii) controlling owners use pyramidal structures to amass 
control over not just a single firm, or even just a few firms, but over large groups of corporations.  
This section surveys empirical evidence about the structure of corporate control around 
the world.  We first highlight the ubiquity of concentrated family control outside the United 
States.  We then discuss control pyramids in detail and show they allow a very small number of 
wealthy individuals or families to leverage substantial wealth into control over corporate assets 
worth vastly more.  While this section primarily emphasizes concentrated control over large 
groups of firms using control pyramids, it also briefly mentions other related structures.   
 
A.   Wealthy Families Control Most Companies around the World  
Corporations have dominant owners 
That large corporations have individuals and families as controlling shareholders contradicts the 
view of the firm popularly attributed to Berle and Means (1932), which implicitly or explicitly 
underlies much of modern economics and finance.1  In this view, a corporation is widely held, in 
that its ownership is dispersed across a large number of small public shareholders, and 
freestanding, in that listed companies generally do not control other listed companies.  Since 
there is no dominant owner, effective control resides in the hand of the management team.  In 
such corporations, corporate governance is about mitigating the divergence of interests, 
described by Jensen and Meckling (1976), between utility maximizing professional managers 
and small public shareholders who would like the value of their shares to be maximized.  
The modern U.S. economy loosely approximates this archetype.  Of course, large 
blockholders and intercorporate equity holdings occur in the United States.  Shleifer and Vishny 
(1986), Morck et al. (1988), Holderness and Sheehan (1988), Anderson and Reeb (2003b), 
                                                 
1 Berle and Means (1932, Ch. 5) actually describe various forms of pyramiding, non-voting shares, and voting 
trusts.  In their sample of the largest 200 firms in the U.S. in 1930, they find that 44% are widely held (they call 
them ‘management controlled’) and 22% are controlled through a ‘legal devise’ (i.e., a pyramid).  In any case, the 
finance literature has for the most part taken Berle and Means as demonstrating that large U.S. firms are largely 
widely held. 
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Anderson, Mansi and Reeb (2003) and others all find numerous instances of large blockholders, 
though they are smaller and much less common in large US firms than in most other countries.  
An important distinction, however, is that block holders in the US seldom control more than one 
corporation.  Thus, the Ford family controls Ford Motors, but not GM, IBM, and 3M as well.  
Indeed, none of these other companies has any controlling shareholder.  In its most recent proxy, 
3M reports that corporate insiders own less than one percent of its stock, and that its largest 
shareholder is a pension fund, with a stake somewhat above three percent.  Morck et al. (1988) 
show that 3M is more typical of large US firms than is Ford, and subsequent work confirms this.  
Indeed, the term “family firm” in the United States is often a synonym for “small firm.”   
However, elsewhere in the world, the typical large firm has a “controlling owner,” – 
usually a wealthy family that controls it as part of a large group of firms.  The assumption of 
freestanding diffusely owned firms, typically justified with a cite to Berle and Means (1932), is 
therefore of questionable generality.  This was first pointed out in studies of corporate 
governance in Germany and Japan, such as Prowse (1992), Berglof and Perotti (1994) and 
Edwards and Fischer (1994).  In a systematic investigation, La Porta et al. (1999) show that 
United States style corporate ownership is quite exceptional.  In most other countries, even very 
large firms have controlling shareholders, and these are usually extremely wealthy families.   
La Porta et al. (1999) investigate the ownership structures of large corporations in 
twenty-seven developed economies.  Their sample contains the top twenty firms in each country, 
ranked by market capitalization of common equity at the end of 1995.  They also collect 
information on ten firms of similar size in each country.  These are the ten smallest firms in each 
country with market capitalization of common equity greater than $500 million at the end of 
1995.  They allow for five types of ultimate controlling owners: (1) a family or an individual, (2) 
the state, (3) a widely held financial institution such as a bank or an insurance company, (4) a 
widely held corporation, and (5) miscellaneous, an entity such as a cooperative, a voting trust, or 
a group with no single controlling investor.  La Porta et al. (1999) argue that stakes exceeding 
fifty percent are not necessary to lock in control in most cases.  This is because most small 
shareholders do not vote at annual meetings.  Consequently, voting stakes in the ten to twenty 
percent range are generally sufficient.   
They report widely held corporations predominating among large firms only in the 
United States and United Kingdom.  Elsewhere, particularly in countries with poor legal and 
weak regulatory protection for public shareholders, even the largest corporations usually have 
controlling shareholders – predominantly wealthy families and the State.  Using a twenty percent 
control threshold, they find that 36% of large corporations on average are widely held.  The 
distribution shifts further away from widely held firms when the sample is based on a ten percent 
control threshold, or on a set of smaller firms, or on countries with poorer shareholder rights 
protection.  In a few countries, notably Belgium and Germany, financial institutions exercise 
extensive voting control over other large publicly traded companies. 
Studies subsequent to La Porta et al. (1999) typically expand the number of firms 
examined and sometimes the number of countries, and tend to confirm the La Porta et al. (1999) 
findings.  Claessens et al. (2000) examine 2,980 publicly traded corporations, including both 
financial and non-financial firms, in Asian countries including Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, 
South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan (China), and Thailand.  Their data 
are for 1996.  Using the existence of a ten percent blockholder to define control, they determine 
that widely held companies account for less than three percent of the corporate sectors of each of 
these countries save Japan and Korea, where the figures are 42% and 14%, respectively.  Using a 
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twenty percent control threshold, widely held companies are still less than twenty percent of the 
corporate sectors of these countries, again except in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan (China); where 
they account for 80%, 43%, and 26% respectively.  The high figures for widely held firms in 
Japan are perhaps misleading, in the sense that most large Japanese firms are organized into 
keiretsu, groups of firms without controlling shareholders that collectively own control blocks in 
each other.  These firms are thus not really widely held in the sense of US and United Kingdom 
firms, for public shareholders do not hold a majority of their stock.   
Faccio and Lang (2002) ascertain the ultimate controlling shareholder of 5,232 
corporations in thirteen Western European countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK.  Using a 
twenty percent control threshold, they find 37% of these companies to be widely-held. This 
figure is only 14% when a ten percent threshold control level is used.  Moreover, the vast 
majority of these widely held firms are in the United Kingdom and Ireland – 63% and 62%, 
respectively, of firms in those countries are widely held.   
Barca and Becht (2001) survey the ownership structures of typical large companies 
across Europe and in the United States.  They also find that the widely held firm is not 
representative for Europe.  They report (p. 19) that the median largest shareholder in a typical 
large corporation votes a 52% stake in Austria, 56% in Belgium, 57% in Germany, 35% in 
Spain, 20% in France, 55% in Italy, 44% in the Netherlands, and 35% in Sweden.  They contrast 
this with a 10% median stake in the United Kingdom and a 5% and 9% median stake among 
NYSE and NASDAQ firms, respectively, in the United States.     
 
Concentrated control of corporation is in the hand of wealthy families  
As noted above, firms around the world have dominant shareholders.  It turns out that these 
dominant shareholders are generally wealthy families.  La Porta et al. (1999) report that among 
the largest firms and using a 20% control threshold, 30% of the firms are family-controlled.  This 
figure increases when a sample of smaller firms is used, or when the threshold of control is 10%. 
Claessens et al. (2000, Table 6, p. 103) measure the incidence of family control in Asian 
countries.  Using a ten percent threshold, 65% of Hong Kong firms are family controlled.  The 
comparable figures are 69% in Indonesia, 13% in Japan, 68% in Korea, 58% in Malaysia, 42% in 
the Philippines, 52% in Singapore, 66% in Taiwan (China), and 57% in Thailand.  Using a 
twenty percent threshold to infer control, the corresponding figures are 67% in Hong Kong, 72% 
in Indonesia, 10% in Japan, 48% in Korea, 67% in Malaysia, 45% in the Philippines, 55% in 
Singapore, 48% in Taiwan (China), and 62% in Thailand.   
Faccio and Lang (2002) report that family control predominates in eleven continental 
European countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.  The incidence of family control, defined as at least twenty 
percent voting control, is lowest in Norway (39%) and highest in France and Germany (65%).  In 
all the other countries they study, family control is at least 46%. 
All these studies confirm the basic observation of La Porta et al. (1999), that diffuse 
corporate ownership of the sort generally associated with Berle and Means (1932) for the US is 
highly exceptional.  Outside of the US and UK, large firms usually have ultimate controlling 
owners, and these are usually very wealthy families.  Table 2 summarizes the findings of these 
various studies, and clearly displays the rarity of widely held firms and the ubiquity of family 
control.  Although Table 2 contains a wealth of data, further work involving additional countries 
and clarifying the determinants of these differences would be very useful.   
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Table 2 – Widely Held Firms versus Family Controlled Firms as Percent of Large 
Corporations in Various Countriesa 
   
Control inferred at 
10%b 
Control inferred at 
20% Source 
Country 
Widely 
held 
Family 
control 
Widely 
held 
Family 
control  
Argentina 0 65 0 65 La Porta et al. (1999, Tables 2 & 3) 
Australia 55 10 65 5 La Porta et al. (1999, Tables 2 & 3) 
Austria 5 15 5 15 La Porta et al. (1999, Tables 2 & 3) 
Belgium  0 50 5 50 La Porta et al. (1999, Tables 2 & 3) 
Canada  50 
17.54 
30 
46.67 
60 
36.24 
25 
26.18 
La Porta et al. (1999, Tables 2 & 3) 
Attig, Gadhoum, Lang (2003) 
Denmark  10 35 40 35 La Porta et al. (1999, Tables 2 & 3) 
Finland   15 10 35 10 La Porta et al. (1999, Tables 2 & 3) 
France  30 
8.92 
20 
70.44 
60 
17.79 
20 
64.83 
La Porta et al. (1999, Tables 2 & 3) 
Faccio, Lang (2002)a 
Germany 35 
5.61 
10 
71.64 
50 
14.02 
10 
64.62 
La Porta et al. (1999, Tables 2 & 3) 
Faccio, Lang (2002) 
Greece 5 65 10 50 La Porta et al. (1999, Tables 2 & 3) 
Hong Kong  10 
0.6 
70 
64.7 
10 
7 
70 
66.7 
La Porta et al. (1999, Tables 2 & 3) 
Claessens, Djankov, Lang (2000) 
Indonesia  0.6 68.6 5.1 71.5 Claessens, Djankov, Lang (2000) 
Ireland 45 15 65 10 La Porta et al. (1999, Tables 2 & 3) 
Israel  5 50 5 50 La Porta et al. (1999, Tables 2 & 3) 
Italy  15 
7.83 
20 
64.87 
20 
15.86 
15 
59.61 
La Porta et al. (1999, Tables 2 & 3) 
Faccio, Lang (2002) 
Japan 50 
42 
10 
13.1 
90 
79.8 
5 
9.7 
La Porta et al. (1999, Tables 2 & 3) 
Claessens, Djankov, Lang (2000) 
Korea 40 
14.3 
35 
67.9 
55 
43.2 
20 
48.4 
La Porta et al. (1999, Tables 2 & 3) 
Claessens, Djankov, Lang (2000) 
Malaysia 1 57.5 10.3 67.2 Claessens, Djankov, Lang (2000) 
Mexico 0 100 0 100 La Porta et al. (1999, Tables 2 & 3) 
Netherlands 30 20 30 20 La Porta et al. (1999, Tables 2 & 3) 
New Zealand 5 45 30 25 La Porta et al. (1999, Tables 2 & 3) 
Norway 5 25 25 25 La Porta et al. (1999, Tables 2 & 3) 
Philippines 1.7 42.1 19.2 44.6 Claessens, Djankov, Lang (2000) 
Portugal   0 50 10 45 La Porta et al. (1999, Tables 2 & 3) 
Singapore  5 
1.4 
45 
52 
15 
5.4 
30 
55.4 
La Porta et al. (1999, Tables 2 & 3) 
Claessens, Djankov, Lang (2000) 
Spain 15 
12.74 
25 
67.33 
35 
28.06 
15 
55.79 
La Porta et al. (1999, Tables 2 & 3) 
Faccio, Lang (2002) 
Sweden 0 55 25 45 La Porta et al. (1999, Tables 2 & 3) 
Switzerland 50 40 60 30 La Porta et al. (1999, Tables 2 & 3) 
Taiwan (China) 2.9 65.6 26.2 48.2 Claessens, Djankov, Lang (2000) 
Thailand   2.2 56.5 6.6 61.6 Claessens, Djankov, Lang (2000) 
United 
Kingdom 
90 
27.06 
5 
33.75 
100 
69.08 
0 
19.88 
La Porta et al. (1999, Tables 2 & 3) 
Faccio, Lang (2002) 
United States   80 
38.95 
20 
23.37 
80 
69.26 
20 
6.13 
La Porta et al. (1999, Tables 2 & 3) 
Attig, Gadhoum, Lang (2003) 
a. The figures from La Porta el at (1999) are for the 20 largest publicly listed firms.  The Attig, Gadhoum and 
Lang (2003) sample is comprised of the 1121 firms in the Toronto Stock Exchange, for which they could find 
ownership data.  Faccio and Lang (2002) and Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) also construct samples of all 
publicly traded firm for which ownership information is available. 
b. The published version of Faccio and Lang (2002) does not have tables with the 10% cutoff.  We report statistics 
in their earlier unpublished draft.   
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Figure 1.   A Stylized Control Pyramid 
A family firm controls a first tier of firms with dominant voting stakes, in this case greater 
than fifty percent.  Each first tier firm controls several second tier firms,  each of which 
controls yet more firms.  The overall effect is to extend the family’s control to encompass 
assets worth substantially more than its actual wealth.   
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> 50% < 50%
< 50% > 50%
> 50% < 50%
< 50% > 50%
> 50% < 50%
< 50% > 50%
< 50%
> 50%
> 50% < 50%
< 50% > 50%
> 50% < 50%
< 50% > 50%
> 50% < 50%
< 50% > 50%
< 50%
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Firm2,2
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Firm3,4
Firm3,5
Firm3,6
Firm3,7
 
B.   The Use of Control Pyramids  
The previous subsections presented evidence that large corporations throughout most of the 
world are not widely held and more often than not are controlled by very wealthy families.  This 
subsection outlines how these families achieve such concentrated corporate control.  The most 
important mechanism families use is the control pyramids, sometimes augmented by multiple 
voting shares and crossholdings.  Control pyramids let these families control not just one large 
firm, but a many large firms collectively worth substantially more than the family’s actual 
wealth.   
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Figure 1 illustrates a simplified control pyramid.  A family firm, which is a holding 
company in this simplified example, holds a majority stake, fifty percent plus one vote, in each 
of a first tier of firms, in this case Firm1,1 and Firm1,2.  The remaining fifty percent minus one 
vote stakes in each are held by small public shareholders.  Each of the first tier firms then holds 
fifty percent plus one vote in a set of second tier firms.  In this case, Firm1,1 holds control blocks 
in Firm2,1 and Firm2,2 while Firm1,2 holds control blocks in Firm2,3 and Firm2,4.  Again, the 
remaining fifty percent, less one vote, in each tier two firm is held by public investors.  Each 
second tier firm then controls a set of third tier firms, and so on, always with public shareholders 
holding the remaining stakes.   
 Suppose each firm in Figure 1 is worth one billion dollars.  The control pyramid lets the 
family, through its one billion dollar family firm, control fourteen other firms, also each worth 
one billion dollars.  Ignoring double counting, the family leverages one billion dollars of 
investment into fifteen billion dollars of control.  There is double counting in this tally since, in 
this simplified example, the assets of the higher tier firms are shares of lower tier firms.  But 
even if only the third tier firms contain actual physical assets, the family has, at a minimum, 
leveraged one billion dollars of family wealth into control over eight billion dollars of real 
corporate assets.  Contrast this with creating eight freestanding one billion dollar firms, or, a 
single eight billion dollar firm.  In either case, the family contributes only one-eighth of the 
equity and controls only 12.5% of the votes.  In contrast, the pyramidal structure in Figure 1 lets 
the family retain absolute control of the eight firms in the third layer of the pyramid, but hold 
only a 12.5% cash flow stake [(50%)(50%)(50%)= 12.5%].  
 To see this more generally, take the chain of ownership from the family apex to any firm 
in the third layer, say firm Firm3,1.  Suppose the family holds 01,1α  of Firm1,1 which holds 1,1 1,2α  of 
Firm2,1 which, in turn, holds 1,21,3α  of Firm3,1.  The superscript, e.g., (1,1), indicates first the 
“controlling” firm’s level in the pyramid and its identity index at the level.  The subscript, e.g., 
(2,1), indicates the “controlled” firm’s level in the pyramid and its identity index at that level.  If, 
at each link in the chain of control, the direct stake is sufficiently large to control the next firm, 
the family effectively controls Firm3,1 while holding stock that entitles it to only 1,21,3
1,1
1,2
0
1,1 ααα ××  
of the firm’s dividends.  This formula can be straightforwardly expanded when there are more 
layers connecting the family with the firm.  Since the α’s are all less than one, this product can 
be a very small number.  Nonetheless, the family controls every firm in the chain of firms 
connecting the family firm to Firm3,1 and so controls that firm too.  Ultimately, the family can 
control many firms in this way even though its actual investment in each is small.   
Actual pyramids are more complicated than Figure 1.  Firms can have varying numbers 
of subsidiaries, and some firms in intermediate tiers of the pyramid can engage in actual 
production activities.  Privately held firms can be interspersed with publicly traded firms.  Firms 
also need not be neatly arranged in successive tiers.  Firms in lower tiers may have cross-
shareholdings.  That is, they may own shares in firms in their own tiers or in upper tiers.   
Cross shareholdings, differential voting shares, and public shareholders’ low participation 
rates in corporate votes generally allow control through chains of even smaller s'α , resulting in 
even more extreme divergence of ownership from control with each additional layer.  Since 
family controlled boards vote cross holdings, these augment direct family voting power.  Super-
voting shares also allow control with smaller values of α.  Returning to our example in Figure 1, 
if super-voting shares let the family exercise control with ten percent at each layer, rather than 
fifty percent, the family’s stake in the third layer would be (10%)(10%)(10%) = 0.1% instead of 
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the 12.5% calculated above.  Since voting rates by public shareholders are generally quite low, a 
ten to twenty percent stake is usually sufficient to control board elections, so the last calculation 
is often relevant even in the absence of multiple voting shares. 
By way of illustration, Morck et al. (2000) follow an actual chain of control through the 
apparently quite well-governed pyramid of the Canadian billionaire heirs Edward and Peter 
Bronfman using data from Statistics Canada’s Directory of Intercorporate Ownership for 1998.  
The brothers “own Broncorp Inc., which controls HIL Corp. with a 19.6% equity stake.  HIL 
owns 97% of Edper Resources, which owns 60% of Brascan Holdings, which owns a 5.1% stake 
in Brascan, which owns 49.9% of Braspower Holdings, which owns 49.3% of Great Lakes 
Power Inc, which owns 100% of First Toronto Investments, which owns 25% of Trilon 
Holdings, which owns 64.5% of Trilon Financial, which owns 41.4% of Gentra, which owns 
31.9% of Imperial Windsor Group.  [The brothers’] actual equity stake in Imperial Windsor 
works out to 0.03%, yet they have full control of it, and of all the other firms in the pyramid 
above and beside it.  This is because they either own a dominant block of the stock at each stage, 
or wield sufficient votes to appoint the board via multiple-voting shares, intercorporate cross-
holdings, or other arrangements that reduce the minimum size of a control stake.  This branch of 
the Bronfman family controls several hundred firms in this way.”  
 
Figure 2.  The ABB Control Pyramid of the Swedish Wallenberg Family 
Ownership stakes are represented with C and voting stakes with V.  Ultimate control is assigned to 
the Wallenberg family through a chain of stakes of at least 20% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: La Porta et al. (1999) 
 
The Bronfman group is too large to represent legibly in a single diagram, however the 
point can be made with a smaller pyramidal group.  La Porta et al. (1999) follow a chain of 
control by which ABB, Sweden’s fourth largest firm by market capitalization, is controlled via a 
32.8% stake held by Incentive, Sweden’s 17th largest firm.  Incentive, in turn, is controlled via a 
43.1% stake held by the Wallenberg Group, which is controlled by Investor, Sweden’s fifth 
largest firm, through a voting arrangement that gives it control over 35.7% of the Wallenberg 
Group’s 43.1% stake in Incentive.  Investor is the Wallenberg’s family run closed end fund and 
serves as the apex firm for their family control pyramid.  In this way, a sharp divergence between 
control rights and cash flow rights characterizes many Swedish firms:  For example, the 
Wallenbergs have voting control over ABB, but actually have a cash flow rights stake of only 
about 5%.  La Porta et al. (1999, Figure 8) describe the ABB pyramidal structure. 
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As we explained above, a control pyramid allows a wealthy family or individual to 
control a large number of firms with relatively limited wealth.  Pyramids permit this by creating 
large deviations between voting rights and cash flow rights; allowing control over many firms 
with a small cash flow stake in each.   
Controlling families effectuate control by placing family members in executive positions 
in key firms throughout a pyramidal group.  La Porta et al. (1999) show that this frequently gives 
controlling families direct executive decision-making power, as well as control via pyramids.  In 
sixty-nine percent of their sample of large firms (the top twenty firms ranked by market 
capitalization of common equity at the end of 1995 in each of 27 countries), the controlling 
families also participate in management.  Participation is defined as a family member (sharing 
the same family last name) being the CEO, the Chairman, the Honorary Chairman, or the Vice-
Chairman of the firm.  The reported percentage underestimates the actual involvement of family 
members in executive position because executives married into the family may not share the 
family name.  Claessens et al. (2000) report that, in East Asian countries (Hong Kong, Indonesia, 
Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand), professional 
managers are rare, and family members or trusted associates are usually in charge.  Top 
managers are family members in about 60% of firms that are not widely held.  These studies are 
about controlling family participation in general, not controlling family participation in the 
management of pyramid member firms in particular.  Empirical exploration of this issue is 
needed. For Italy, however, Volpin (2002) presents data about family members participation in 
firms that belong to pyramidal groups.  He finds that 50% of top executives in the top layer of a 
pyramid are members of the controlling family.  For lower layers, the figure is smaller: 26% for 
layer two firms, and 7.4% for layers three and below. 
 The discussion in this subsection leaves us with the following important points.  By using 
pyramids and, to a lesser extent, crossholdings, super-voting shares, and the appointment of 
family members as executives, a wealthy family can secure control of a corporation without 
making a commensurate equity investment.  Pyramids in particular allow a divergence of voting 
rights from cash flow rights much greater than is typically possible through direct ownership.  
Pyramids thus allow a family with a given level of wealth to control corporate assets worth 
considerably more than direct ownership would permit.    
 
C.   Other Types of Group Control 
La Porta et al. (1999) show that control pyramids are by far the most important corporate group 
structures, but publicly traded companies can control each other in other ways.  These generate 
other group structures that are important in particular countries.  For example, Japanese firms are 
organized into groups called keiretsu, in which firms with no controlling shareholders each hold 
small stakes in one another, but these stakes collectively amount to control blocks.  Thus, each 
firm is controlled by the professional managers of all the other firms in the group.  France, 
Canada, Germany, and other countries also contain control pyramids without family firms at the 
apex.  In some cases the apex firm is itself widely held.  In France and Canada, some control 
pyramids of publicly traded firms have state-owned enterprises as their apex firms.  In Germany, 
banks sometimes serve as de facto apex firms.  Since public shareholders in German firms 
routinely sign over their voting rights to the banks that manage their stock accounts, these control 
pyramids can consist of nominally widely held firms held together by banks voting the holdings 
of small shareholders.  The large German banks are all widely held, so the bank managers 
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collectively vote majorities of their own stock.2  Recent reforms require German banks to advise 
investors of their right to vote their own shares, and this may effectively dismantle such 
structures over time.  Of course family control pyramids are also important in all of these 
countries.  We use the term corporate group to refer to all of these structures collectively, and 
reserve the term family control pyramid for business groups with a basically pyramidal structure 
of inter-corporate ownership and a family firm at the apex.  
 
D. A Few Wealthy Families Control a Large Fraction of Many Economies 
That family control is widespread around the world is perhaps interesting, but hardly unsettling.  
What makes this situation important to understanding of economies outside the United States and 
United Kingdom is that control pyramids concentrate a country’s corporate decision-making in 
remarkably few hands.     
The articles surveyed above are filled with representative examples.   
As discussed, in §IIIB, Morck et al. (2000) describe how the Canadian Bornfman family 
extends its considerable wealth into control over corporate assets worth vastly more.  Attig, 
Gadhoum and Lang (2003) add descriptions of the Manix, McCain, and the Bentley families.  La 
Porta et al. (1999) discuss yet other examples of Canadian control pyramids.  While these 
examples show how wealthy Canadian families greatly magnify their economic control, Morck 
et al. (2000) report that widely held firms are also commonplace in that country.  Thus, no single 
family controls a predominant slice of the national economy.   
Contrast this to Sweden, where Angblad et al. (2001, p. 228) report that one family, the 
Wallenbergs, controls roughly half of the market capitalization of the Stockholm Stock 
Exchange.  This is accomplished through a huge and complicated control pyramid.  What 
distinguishes Sweden from Canada is that control rights in Swedish firms are substantially in the 
hands of a single family, rather than a handful of families and numerous professional managers.   
Other countries typically fall between the extremes represented by Canada and Sweden.  
For example, La Porta et al. (1999), Bianchi et al. (2001), and Faccio and Lang (2002) describe 
the control pyramid that lets the Agnelli family control corporate assets worth vastly more than 
their actual family wealth in Italy.  Faccio and Lang (2002) further report that the Agnellis 
control 10.4% of that country’s total market capitalization.  Overall, across Western Europe, the 
value of corporate assets controlled by the leading family, measured as a fraction of market 
capitalization, ranges from 18% in Switzerland to only 1.10% in the United Kingdom.  For the 
ten largest families, the figures are 19% for Austria, 30% for Belgium, 22% for Finland, 29% for 
France, 21% for Germany, 14% for Ireland, 20% for Italy, 23% for Norway, 34% for Portugal, 
11% for Spain, 13% for Sweden, 29% for Switzerland and only 4% for the United Kingdom.    
Gorton and Winton (2003) describe extensive pyramiding in Germany.  They argue that 
German banks’ exercise of proxy voting rights for shares owned by small investors effectively 
creates pyramids of seemingly widely held firms with large banks at the apex.  The large banks 
are widely held, so their shares are voted by the banks and their affiliated insurance companies.   
East Asian economies tend to resemble Sweden more than Canada.  Claessens et al. 
(2000) find that the top fifteen family control pyramids in typical East Asian economies hold 
corporate assets worth a large fraction of GDP - 84% of GDP in Hong Kong, 76.2% in Malaysia, 
48.3% in Singapore, 46.7% in the Philippines, and 39.3% in Thailand (these are the largest 
numbers reported).  They state (p. 109) that, “these results suggest that a relatively small number 
of families effectively control most East Asian economies”.  They also find that the single 
                                                 
2 Along with the managers of large insurance companies, affiliated with the banks.   
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wealthiest family controls 17.1% of the market capitalization in the Philippines, 16.6% in 
Indonesia, and 11.4% in South Korea. 
La Porta et al. (1999) report that Huchison Whampoa, the third largest listed firm in 
Hong Kong, is 43.9% controlled by Cheung Kong Holdings, the fifth largest listed firm, which is 
35% owned by Li Ka Shing family.  Li Ka Shing, through a pyramidal arrangement, controls 
three of the twenty largest firms, including the eleventh largest, Hong Kong Electric Holdings.  
Claessens et al. (2000) provide further description of the Li Ka Shing control pyramid.   
Claessens et al. (2000) describe the extensive control exercised by the Ayala pyramid in 
the Philippines.  The Ayala Corporation, the second largest listed firm on the Manila Exchange 
in terms of market capitalization, controls Ayala Land, the largest. The Bank of the Philippine 
Islands, the fifth largest, also belongs to the Ayala control pyramid.  The principal owner of the 
Ayala corporation is the privately held Mermac Inc.  The Tokyo Mitsubishi Bank controls 23%, 
and others control less than 5% each. Mermac is 100% controlled by the Ayala family.    
Bae, Kang, and Kim (2002) describe the importance of Korean family controlled 
pyramids, or chaebols.  Chaebol, while basically pyramidal in nature have extensive reciprocal 
holdings as well as simple pyramidal intercorporate ownership links.  The top thirty chaebols 
“contribute to 62.5% of the total assets and 72.6% of the gross sales of all listed firms” (p. 2699) 
and each is diversified across many unrelated industries.  Each is also controlled by a single 
wealthy family (p. 2702).   
Figure 3 shows the wealth of billionaires as a fraction of GDP, expressed as dollars of 
billionaire wealth per thousand dollars of gross domestic product.    
 
Figure 3.  Billionaire Wealth per Billion Dollars of GDP 
Billionaire nationalities as listed in Forbes Magazine’s annual list of US dollar billionaires for 1996.   
Source:  Morck, Stangeland, and Yeung (2000). 
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E. Summary 
These findings in this section condense into three crucial points.  First, the prevalence of widely 
held firms in the large corporate sectors of the US and UK is highly exceptional.  Second, the 
large corporate sectors, excluding state-owned enterprises, of most countries are predominantly 
controlled by very wealthy families.  Third, the number of wealthy families exercising this 
control is typically quite small because control pyramids translate substantial family wealth into 
command of corporate assets worth vastly more.  In some countries, individual families use this 
technique to control considerable, and even predominant, slices of the country’s market 
capitalization. 
 Further careful empirical work is clearly needed to verify the actual extents to which 
these points genuinely characterize different countries.  But assuming they are correct, they raise 
a curious question: Why are pyramidal firm groups so much rarer in the United States and United 
Kingdom?  Or, are pyramidal groups a heretofore neglected aspect of corporate governance in 
the United States and United Kingdom?  
 
IV.  Potential Benefits of Control Pyramids  
We now examine the impact of such disproportionate control over a country’s corporate assets 
by tiny elites of extremely wealthy individuals and families – both at the firm level and at the 
economy level.  We first review work consistent with dominant shareholders exerting a positive 
effect on firm performance.  We note that much of this work does not carry over from 
freestanding firms with dominant shareholders to pyramidal groups.  We then turn to negative 
effects in Section V.  
 
A. The Performance of Freestanding Family Controlled Firms  
Several studies suggest that family control per se might often have a positive effect on firm 
performance.  Anderson and Reeb (2003b) study 403 firms in the Standard and Poor’s 500, an 
index of large U.S. firms.  They find that about one-third of them have individuals or families as 
substantial shareholders, holding altogether 18% of equity value.  Using data for 1992 through 
1999, excluding utilities and banks, they regress Tobin’s average q, a standardized measure of 
firm valuation and a well-accepted proxy for the quality of corporate governance, on a standard 
set of control variables plus individual and family ownership and dummies for the presence of a 
founder or heir as CEO.3  They report that public shareholders assign substantially higher values 
to firms with a large block held by an individual or family.  They report an especially large value 
premium for firms whose founders retain equity holdings, and a smaller, but still statistically 
significant value premium for firms with other large individual or family shareholders.  
Anderson and Reeb (2003a) use the same sample and find that family controlled firms are less 
diversified, after controlling for size, outside directors and block shareholders.  They conclude 
that “family firms perform as well as, if not better than, non-family firms.”   
 Morck et al. (1988) reach the same conclusion for US firms in which the founder or a 
member of the founding family is present in management and the firm was incorporated within 
the previous thirty years.  But for older firms with founders or their relatives in management, 
they report a significant value discount.  Holderness and Sheehan (1988) report no systematic 
performance difference associated with large US shareholders.  However, Perez-Gonzalez 
                                                 
3 Tobin’s average q is the market value of all the firm’s financial obligations over the total value of its physical and 
intangible assets.  An average q above one, adjusting for appropriate control variables, is interpreted as evidence that 
managers have used the firm’s assets to create value for investors.  See Morck et al. (1988) for further detail.   
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(2002), using United States data, divide 162 CEO transitions where the retiring CEO is a 
member of the founding family into cases where the succeeding CEO is a member of the 
founding family and cases where she is not.  Stock prices, returns on assets and market-to-book 
ratios fall sharply for firms with inherited control, but not for firms where the CEO is unrelated 
to the founding family.  Moreover, these declines are particularly prominent for firms that 
appoint family CEOs who did not attend a selective college.  Indeed, the differences between 
firms with outside succession and in-family succession by an offspring alumnus of a selective 
college are not statistically different.  Clearly, these results suggest that large block-
shareholdings by a family, and family involvement in management, need not destroy value, and 
may even add value for public shareholders – especially when family control means control by 
an entrepreneurial founder or a demonstrably competent heir.  Further studies along these lines 
for other countries would be highly useful.  
 Similarly, in an event study using Canadian family controlled firms, Smith and Amoako-
Adu (1999) report share price drops when heirs take charge - especially if the heirs are young.  
They propose that older heirs, with more business experience, might reassure investors. 
 Caselli and Gennaioli (2003) develop a model of dynastic management – the passing of 
control from father to son.  In their model, this is a potential source of inefficiency because heirs 
may inherit little of their parents’ talent for managerial decision making.  They explore the 
macroeconomic causes and consequences of dynastic management, and derive that the incidence 
of dynastic management depends on the severity of asset market imperfections, the saving rate, 
and the inheritability of talent.  Using numerical simulations, they show that dynastic 
management may be a substantial contributor to observed cross-country differences in 
productivity. 
 Unfortunately, the empirical results cited above, except Smith and Amoako-Adu (1999), 
use U.S. data.  Further studies using data from other countries are needed.  This is because US 
data is exceptional for its lack of control pyramids, and for the rarity and fleeting nature of its 
intercorporate blockholdings.  Allen and Phillips (2000) report 227 instances of one U.S. firm 
buying blocks of stock in one another from 1980 to 1991.  These equity stakes are usually small; 
averaging 15% of the seller’s equity, and so are referred to as toeholds.  This is because they are 
often preliminary to complete takeovers.  Indeed Mikkelson and Ruback (1985) and Choi (1991) 
can explain positive announcement abnormal returns associated with such purchases by the 
anticipation of subsequent takeovers.  In some cases, joint venture partner firms may also 
exchange blocks of stock.  Thus, U.S. inter-corporate equity blocks are usually between pairs of 
otherwise freestanding firms.  The only extant pyramidal structure in the United States, to our 
knowledge, is the venture capital organization, Thermo Electron, which retains control blocks in 
its high technology public spin offs.  Thus, family control and inter-corporate blockholdings in 
the U.S. are quite atypical; for wealthy U.S. families seem virtually always to control but a single 
large publicly trade firm.  In contrast, the previous section showed that family control and inter-
corporate block shareholdings elsewhere are often associated with control pyramids that extend a 
single family’s control over many large corporations.  
 The US results described above allow that, in freestanding firms, family control might 
sometimes be a net advantage.  However, findings regarding freestanding firms cannot be 
applied hastily to pyramid firms, and empirical studies suggest important differences.  For 
example,  Morck et al. (2000), after controlling for firm age, size and main industry, report that 
Canadian heir controlled firms are less profitable than otherwise comparable firms in the US and 
in Canada.  One possible explanation is that typical Canadian heirs running large firms are worse 
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managers than their US counterparts.  Another is that many large Canadian firms belong to 
pyramidal groups.  While we cannot preclude the former reason, the latter seems more 
immediately plausible.  We therefore consider ways in which pyramidal structures might affect 
firm performance – positively and negatively.  
 
B.  Could Control Pyramids Have Positive Effects? 
Control pyramids must be of value to someone, or they would not predominate as they do in 
many economies.  An emerging empirical literature attempts to identify advantages conferred by 
family control pyramids.  We review some of the most important contributions.    
 Khanna and Rivkin (2001) examine firms affiliated with business groups in Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, India, Indonesia, Israel, Korea, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, 
Taiwan (China), Thailand, and Turkey.  They define a business group as “a set of firms which, 
though legally independent, are bound together by a constellation of formal and informal ties and 
are accustomed to taking coordinated actions.”  They note that this definition “captures ‘ties’ that 
hold group firms together and the coordinated actions those ties enable.”  Thus, they are 
examining control pyramids run by families as well as other corporate groups; however, most of 
the groups they examine appear to be family control pyramids.  They report higher average 
returns on assets (ROA) among group firms in all the countries they study save Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru and the Philippines.  They also find lower variation in ROA for 
group firms, except in Mexico and Turkey.  From these findings, they conclude “not only that 
members of a group incur costs and reap benefits, but also that the costs and benefits are shared.”  
 Khanna and Palepu (2000a) compare the performance of member firms of Indian 
business groups, which are family control pyramids, with that of freestanding firms.  Some of 
these business groups span many distinct industries, while others are more focused.  They find 
that accounting and stock market measures of firm performance for group affiliates have non-
monotonic relationships with group diversification.  Firms in somewhat diversified control 
pyramids perform worse than free-standing firms, while firms in highly diversified control 
pyramids perform better than their freestanding peers.  Apparently, a high level of diversification 
ultimately benefits group affiliates.   
 Khanna and Palepu (2000a) and Khanna and Rivkin (2001) both explain their findings by 
positing various arguments as to why the group structure might be an advantage in economies 
with poorly functioning markets and institutions that might cause unrelated firms to have 
difficulty writing and enforcing contracts with each other.  The idea that groups mitigate market 
frictions goes back to Leff (1976, 1978). 
One set of arguments stems from the need to overcome capital market frictions.  In 
economies where information asymmetry is severe and institutional devices to signal 
trustworthiness are inadequate and ineffective, external financing is expensive and limited.  A 
group structure can enhance monitoring and overcome liquidity constraints by letting group 
firms pool resources.  The pyramid’s controlling shareholder could potentially allocate capital 
more efficiently than the weak capital market could.  Yet, reliance on such an “internal capital 
market” can distort the incentives of unit managers.  This is essentially the same “internal versus 
external capital market argument” that Lewellen (1971), Gertner, Scharfstein, Stein (1994) and 
Stein (1997) develop in connection with freestanding U.S. conglomerates.   
In a similar vein, Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer (2003) examine whether entrepreneurs 
want to surrender control of firms they found.  They accept the potential benefits of owner 
control, but pitch them against the utilization of outside capable professional managers.  When 
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the benefits are less than the forgone benefits of rendering control to capable outside professional 
managers, a case may exist for surrendering control.  Outside professional managers, however, 
may expropriate firm value.  Thence, the forces that factor in on the question of whether to 
surrender control are the amenities and benefits of running a family business verse the extra firm 
value capable professional managers can bring in net of their expropriation and the monitoring 
costs.  The latter is less in an environment where managers can more readily disregard outside 
shareholder’s property rights.  The lack of separation between management and ownership 
control is evidence of underdevelopment in financial markets. 
Most of the results which show that “groups” may have a positive effect on firm 
performance are based on developing or newly developed countries data.  It is not clear whether 
the lack of reported results for developed countries indicates lack of empirical attempts using 
developed country data or that it validates the theoretical arguments like in Burkart, Panunzi and 
Shliefer (2003).  [Journals seem to have a bias against publishing papers that report insignificant 
statistical results.] 
More generally the arguments proposed by Khanna and Palepu (2000a) and others stem 
from the need to overcome frictions in factor markets.  In essence, markets for capital, 
managerial talent, and intangibles are internalized within groups because external markets are 
poorly developed.  When institutions are weak, doing business with strangers is dangerous and 
unreliable.  This impedes the operation of labor, capital, knowledge, and product markets.  
However, families with reputations for fairness and good management practices are especially 
sought after as business partners in such environments.  Control pyramids let families with good 
reputations achieve greater economies of scale, and thus allow a higher degree of trust than 
would otherwise be possible.  This, in turn, facilitates economic activity.  Control pyramids may 
well be an economically rational response to poorly functioning markets in developing 
economies.  In economies where external markets for professional managers are thin and 
underdeveloped, a group’s internal market structure can lead to more investment in recruiting, 
training, and greater incentives for employees to develop “group specific human capital”.  
Similar considerations apply to the development of market skills and brand-names.   
A separate argument turns on the relationships between a firm’s stakeholders – the 
various claimants to its cash flows such as the State, the public, the firm’s workers, creditors, 
suppliers, customers, and various types of its shareholders.  Roe (2003) argues that family 
control pyramids serve to protect shareholders from powerful labor unions and other social 
interests.  These arguments are perhaps plausible as explanations for the prevalence of control 
pyramids in developed welfare state economies like Sweden and Canada, but, as Roe (2003) 
concedes, they seem inadequate at explaining their persistence in developing economies.  In 
support of his argument, Roe (2003) shows that countries with more socialistic politics and 
stronger labor rights have less dispersed ownership.  One difficulty we have with the Roe (2003) 
argument is that causality is not easily determined.  Leftist politics and strong labor movements 
might just as easily form to counter the power of wealthy families controlling multiple 
corporations.  Another difficulty with Roe’s argument is that pyramids give controlling 
shareholders interests that can sharply diverge from those of public shareholders.  Further work 
is clearly needed to clarify these issues.   
 
C. But, why Pyramids?  
The literature positing positive effects of pyramidal structures, whether derived from Khanna and 
Palepu (2000a) or Roe (2003), begs the question why pyramidal groups form, instead of 
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freestanding conglomerates.  Research on this question is very sparse, as far as we know.  We 
can therefore only offer several conjectures.   
 First, separately registered firms might provide at least some limited liability protection, 
so that a parent firm’s losses not exceed its initial investment.  Limited liability, however, also 
reduces outside investors’ ability to recover their investments in case of a loss.  In addition, 
limited liability need not always provide full protection.  For instance, Morck and Nakamura 
(2004) show that, when the Suzuki group’s Taiwan Bank failed in 1930s Japan, all the other 
companies in the Suzuki family’s pyramid failed simultaneously too. 
 Second, a pyramid might create space for the promotion of bright executives to top 
management positions.  Perhaps these people would be frustrated as middle managers in a big 
conglomerate.  Also, running a legally separated unit may give these executives more freedom 
and perhaps might create better career incentives.  However, this freedom is likely to be quite 
illusory because the controlling family often retains executive decision power.  
 Third, many smaller firms, rather than one huge one, might conceivably allow better 
monitoring of professional managers by the family.  Pyramids might be less opaque than a single 
conglomerate – to the controlling family, if not to public shareholders.  This point and the 
previous one are consistent with Baker (1992), who proposes that conglomerates are more 
efficiently run when head office delegates as much power as possible to operational units.  It is 
possible that pyramidal groups insulate individual operations from the head office more 
effectively than conglomerate divisions.  However, we are unaware of any evidence regarding 
this.    
 Fourth, many US conglomerates have recently issued tracking stocks.  These are stocks 
whose dividends are tied to a single division of the conglomerate.  D'Souza and Jacob (2000) 
report a positive abnormal stock return upon the creation of tracking stocks, indicating that many 
related stocks controlled by the same top managers are worth more than a single conglomerate’s 
stock.  They propose that distinct stocks might allow readier resolution of information 
asymmetries and principal agent problems, and Gigler and Hemmer (2002) provide an 
information theory model along these lines.  Perhaps analogous models apply to pyramidal and 
other corporate groups.   
 Fifth, Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991) argue that Japanese firms provide capital 
to other firms in their corporate groups that are experiencing financial difficulties.  They propose 
that this intercorporate insurance enhances economic efficiency by reducing bankruptcy costs.  
Although, Morck and Nakamura (1999) present evidence that such transactions are better be 
viewed as bailouts, and are probably not economically efficient, corporate groups in other 
countries might still perform the function Hoshi et al. envision.  
 Sixth, Almeida and Wolfenzon (2003a) argue that capital market frictions induce 
pyramids.  In their model, weak investor protection keeps firms from raising external finance 
unless internal funds are available as “seed money”.   If a wealthy family sets up a new 
freestanding firm, it has only family wealth available as seed money, which should include 
dividends paid from firms it controls.  But if it uses an existing firm to set up a new one, the 
accumulated retained earnings of that firm are available as “internal funds”.   
 Of course, this framework fails to explain why the wealthy family doesn’t simply expand 
an existing firm by issuing equity or debt.  However, as Landes (1949) points out in connection 
with French family firms, equity issues dilute the family’s control block and debt issues raise the 
risk of bankruptcy.  Both modes of expansion thus raise the risk of the family losing control.      
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 In essence, Almeida and Wolfenzon (2003a), augmented by wealthy family’s desires to 
retain control, echo the explanation of Yoshisuke Aikawa (1934), the founder of the Nissan 
pyramidal corporate group in pre-war Japan, of why he opted for a pyramidal structure.  He 
explains that pyramids are an ideal solution to what he calls the “capitalist's quandary”.  If a 
capitalist uses only his own money or his family's money, his scale of operations is too small.  If 
he taps public equity markets, he risks losing control.  But, as discussed above in connection 
with Figure 1, a pyramidal group provides the best of both worlds – secure control and unlimited 
access to public capital. 4    
 Finally, Morck et al. (2000) and Morck and Yeung (2004) propose that political influence 
is proportional to what one controls, not what one actually owns.  As we explain in more detail 
below, this might allow the controlling owners of pyramidal groups unrivaled political influence 
in many countries.  Morck and Yeung (2004) argue that, by magnifying the wealth of an 
individual or family into control over corporate assets worth vastly more, pyramids magnify 
political influence in the same proportion.  The wealthy individual or family can use this 
amplified political clout to alter the economy’s institutional framework to favor themselves or 
their firms, to capture transfer payments, and so on.  This advantage might be considerable, 
especially in economies with readily corruptible politicians and officials.  Indeed, it might be so 
large as to explain apparently superior firm level performance, as found by Khanna and Pzalepu 
(2001a) and Khanna and Rivkin (2001), despite obvious evidence of poor governance and 
overall poor economy performance.  Krueger (1993), Murphy et al. (1991, 1993), and many 
others argue that economies in which political rent-seeking is highly profitable grow slowly.  If 
pyramidal groups prosper because they are especially adept rent-seekers, they perhaps ought to 
contain the best performing firms in the worst performing countries.  Further work is needed to 
clarify these issues.   
 
V.  Control Pyramids and the Separation of Ownership from Control 
The discussion above suggests that, even were control pyramids economically salubrious, for 
example as devices for circumventing inadequate institutions, there are nonetheless reasons for 
taking a more skeptical view.  Certainly, Yoshisuke Aikawa’s (1934) enthusiasm for control 
pyramids demonstrates scant concern for the rights of public shareholders.    
 The first reason for skepticism is that a pyramidal corporate ownership structure allows 
the controlling shareholder to secure control rights without commensurate cash flow rights.  
Secure control rights protect the controlling owner from losing power – that is, they allow her 
entrenchment.  Furthermore, as we show below, once control is secured, the controlling 
shareholder’s low cash flow rights lead to agency problems, including non-value maximizing 
investment and incentives to divert resources.   
 Second, in family-controlled pyramids, family members often retain top management 
positions.  Succession by inheritance can have a negative effect because top management 
positions go, not to the most capable, but, at best, to the most capable member of the controlling 
family, as modeled by Caselli and Gennaioli (2003).   
 Third, even were resources efficiently managed and allocated within a group controlled 
by single family, corporate groups can still be undesirable.  Almeida and Wolfenzon (2003b) 
argue that the efficient allocation of resources within a group can actually exacerbate the 
inefficient allocation of resources across groups.   
                                                 
4 See Morck and Nakamura (2004) for details. 
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 Finally, the concentrated control of productive assets by a few families gives them market 
power, both in the goods and capital markets, leading to potentially undesirable economic 
consequences.  Morck and Nakamura (2004) explain how this was the explicit rationale cited by 
the United States Occupation Force for dismantling the main Japanese family control pyramids 
after World War II.   
 Widespread problems of these types, especially those that impair capital markets, can 
create inefficiencies that hamper outside financing, discourage innovation, and retard economic 
growth.  These inefficiencies can arise at both the firm level and overall economy level.  In this 
section we focus on inefficiencies at the firm level.  These stem primarily from the separation of 
ownership and control in the pyramid – the first two points enumerated above.  The next section 
focuses on inefficiencies at the economy level which stems from the control of a very large 
number of firms by a single family – the last two points listed above.  This section is deliberately 
brief, for other surveys, notably Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Denis and McConnell (2003) 
cover some of this material, though not from the perspective we emphasize here. 
 
A.  Divergence of Interests Agency Problems 
The problems caused by the separation of ownership and control in pyramidal groups are similar 
to those described in Berle and Means (1932) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) in connection 
with widely held firms.  Indeed, Berle and Means (1932) explicitly describe pyramids as having 
problems like those of widely held firms.  Jensen and Meckling argue that the managers of firms 
with dispersed shareholders have substantial discretion as to the actions they take because 
individual shareholders cannot coordinate to share monitoring and control costs.  This lets 
managers take actions with benefits that, by their nature, are not shared with shareholders.  In 
addition to indirect financial benefits, like on-the-job consumption or shirking, and direct 
financial benefits, like redirecting corporate assets into a personal account, control also provides 
intangible benefits, like status, political influence, and power over people.  The literature denotes 
all of these benefits as private benefits of control.  Managers pursue private benefits, but balance 
this against their losses when the price of their shares in the firm falls plus the consequences of 
getting “caught and punished,” such as losing their jobs.  This balance means managers might 
choose an action with lower total value over one with higher value, as long as the former 
generated sufficient private benefits.  This divergence of interests is greater the lower the 
managers’ equity stake and the lower the likelihood of her getting caught and punished for non-
value maximizing behavior. 
As we described in section 3, firms outside the United States and United Kingdom are 
owned, not solely by dispersed small shareholders, but by wealthy families via control pyramids.  
Pyramids allow a family to retain control of many firms while holding only a small fraction of 
their cash flow rights.  Indeed, we presented examples in which the cash flow rights of the 
controlling family in some of the pyramid member firms are comparable to the stakes of the 
managers of the most diffusely held of U.S. corporations.  By allowing cash flow rights and 
voting rights to diverge, control pyramids permit the same divergence of interest problems as 
dispersed ownership, even though the firms in the pyramid are not widely held. 
This divergence of interests can lead to inefficient investment in firms in which a 
controlling owner has small cash flow rights.  This is because the controlling family earns only a 
small part, corresponding to its small cash flow rights in such a firm, of any investment’s 
monetary payoff, but can retain all of any private benefits the investment generates.  Only in the 
 22
special case of an investment that maximizes total surplus also maximizing the controlling 
owner’s private benefits should we observe efficient investment decisions.     
A related reason for inefficient investment arises from the high cost of capital that this 
divergence of interest entails.  This high cost stems from minority shareholders’ rational 
expectation that this divergence of interest distorts corporate decisions to benefit controlling 
shareholders.  Such problems are defined in the Corporations Law of many countries as 
oppression of public shareholders by the controlling shareholder.  Oppression problems are thus 
a variant of “perks” consumption, where the perks are diversions to benefit the controlling 
shareholder rather than professional managers.  La Porta et al. (1999) document countries 
varying substantially regarding the protection their laws afford external investors against 
oppression.  Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) show that, when a controlling shareholder has a low 
cash flow stake, as with firms at the base of a pyramid, the cost of capital to the firm is high 
since other investors anticipate expropriation, and pay depressed prices for any securities that 
firm sells.  A consequence of this high cost of capital is severely distorted investment decisions 
because of those firms’ reluctance to raise external funds. 
 
B.  Entrenchment Agency Problems 
The corporate finance literature notes a second type of agency problem, called entrenchment.  
While Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that insiders with larger stakes have less incentive to 
misallocate corporate resources, Stulz (1988) argues that higher equity stakes also give insiders 
more freedom to misallocate resources.  This is because top executives who own large blocks of 
equity are effectively tenured.  Non-value-maximizing managers with little stock can be removed 
in proxy fights by disgruntled institutional investors or ousted by hostile raiders attracted by a 
depressed share price.  Top executives with large blocks of equity cannot be cast out in these 
ways.  Thus, a dominant equity stake lets corporate insiders enjoy private benefits of control 
robustly, whereas a smaller stake means they must limit their inhalation to keep their share prices 
high enough to ward off raiders and placate institutional investors.   
 Moreover, entrenchment problems can take on a qualitatively distinct air, for 
entrenchment can lock in control by honest but inept insiders as well as clever self-serving 
insiders.  For example, entrenchment problems occur if a firm’s controlling founder bequeaths 
her stock to an egregiously incompetent, but power hungry son.  The incompetent son cannot 
manage the firm well, but cannot be removed by the other shareholders because his share of 
votes is sufficiently large to control the board.  The power hungry son gains such utility from 
controlling the firm that the effects of his blunders on the value of his stock are an acceptable 
cost to him.  While this might even be Pareto efficient, it clearly raises important distributive 
questions, to which we return below.  This sort of entrenchment is especially difficult to counter, 
for if the controlling shareholder used his control rights to enrich himself pecuniarily at the 
expense of public shareholders, this could be proscribed as “oppression”.   
Of course, this picture is overly simplified.  In principle, without maintaining a dominant 
voting share, the CEO of a widely held firm could also dominate the board through sheer force of 
personality, and push through an array of anti-takeover defenses, such as poison pills, staggered 
boards, and the like, to deter raiders and activist shareholders.   
Managerial entrenchment can occur in freestanding firms.  Indeed, Almazan and Suarez 
(2003) argue that a degree of entrenchment might be part of an optimal compensation contract 
for top managers.  Nonetheless, as Nissan founder Yoshisuke Aikawa’s (1934) unwittingly 
emphasized, a fundamental raison d’être of control pyramids is precisely that they lock in 
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control.  That is, a pyramidal structure is itself a means to entrench the controlling shareholder 
without the cost of maintaining a large equity stake, nor the machinations of having to establish 
poison pills or staggered boards.  Control pyramids per se are simple and highly effective anti-
takeover devices.   
To see this, return to Figure 1 and recall the discussion in §IIIB.  The family appoints the 
boards of directors of companies in the first tier, and so can place family members in dominant 
positions on those boards and as top executives.  The first tier firm’s boards then appoint the 
boards of companies in the second tier, which then appoint the boards of companies in the third 
tier.  This locks in family control over all the companies in the pyramid, even though public 
shareholders contribute most of the financing for most of its firms.  In contrast, had the family 
established a single firm with eight billion dollars worth of physical assets (a union of the firms 
in the third layer), its billion dollars in family wealth would have constituted a 12.5% stake, and 
public shareholders could outvote the family in shareholder meetings.  This would render family 
control contestable.   
Note further that entrenchment via control pyramids is intimately linked to the 
appointment of family members to the boards of the apex firm and other firms throughout the 
pyramid.  The example above – allowing “an egregiously incompetent, but power hungry son” to 
retain control – underscores the potential for damage to firm value due to entrenchment.  But, the 
potential for damage goes beyond the controlling manager having excessive freedom to pursue 
her self-interest at the expense of firm value.  It also includes the possibility that an incompetent 
manager might retain her job precisely because she can extract more personal gains from the job 
than a competent manager could.  Indeed, Bebchuk, Kraakman, and Triantis (2000) suggest that 
control might naturally pass to “the most efficient thief” because he is willing to pay the most for 
a control block.   
 
C. Tunneling 
The firms low in control pyramids, in which the controlling shareholder’s cash flow rights are 
small, are thus vulnerable to concurrent divergence of interests and entrenchment problems.  One 
consequence of this juxtaposition is that the controlling shareholder has an incentive to transfer 
money aggressively out of these firms and into firms near the pyramid’s apex – or even into her 
personal holdings.  Of course, these transactions can require complex schemes to be effective.  
Nonetheless, when the controlling family runs many firms, they can take the form of 
intercorporate business transactions.   
 The act of transferring value from one pyramid firm to another is dubbed tunneling by 
Johnson et al. (2000).5  Value can be transferred between controlled firms via transfer pricing, the 
provision of capital at artificial prices; or via inflated payments for intangibles such as patents, 
brand names, and insurance.  Although the firm at the receiving end of the tunnel benefits from 
the wealth transfer, public shareholders of the wealth donating firm understandably might view 
the transfer as a governance problem.  Johnson et al. (2000) provide detailed examples of 
tunneling.  
 The transfer of funds from one group firm to another is integral to many of the socially 
desirable functions of corporate groups posited above.  Tunneling undertaken with such ends in 
                                                 
5 Tunneling is of course another type of agency problem, but we treat it separately here due to its importance.  An 
agency problem is one where an agent, in this case controlling family, can take actions that negatively affect the 
utility of the principal, in this case the minority shareholders.  In this sense, both entrenchment and tunneling are 
agency problems. 
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mind perhaps ought to be encouraged, not condemned as a governance problem.  Indeed, such 
transfers might well balance out over time for any given group firm.   
 However, the controlling owners of pyramids benefit from the systematic percolation of 
wealth from firms near the pyramid’s base upward to firms near its apex.  To see this, return 
again to Figure 1.  Suppose that firm3,1 generates new wealth worth one million dollars.  As was 
shown above, this translates into additional wealth of $125,000 for the ultimate owners.  The 
remaining $875,000 accrues to public shareholders in the various tiers of the pyramid.  But if 
firm3,1 overpays firm1.1 by one million dollars for some good or service, the new wealth is 
“tunneled” to firm1,1.  This means the controlling owner benefits by $500,000 and the public 
shareholders of firm3,1 and firm2,1 get none of the new wealth.  In the most extreme case of 
tunneling, the wealth is transferred directly to the family firm at the apex, or to another firm that 
is fully owned by the family.6  In these ways, tunneling lifts assets and income from lower to 
higher tier firms, and dumps losses and liabilities from higher to lower levels of the pyramid.   
 Tunneling does not require a control pyramid of firms.  For example, the Enron scandal 
in the United States apparently involved the transfer of wealth from Enron, a widely held 
company, to private companies controlled by Enron’s professional managers.  However, 
tunneling is plausibly a more everyday concern in economies dominated by control pyramids.   
 In passing, tunneling should be familiar to students of multinationals, which are known to 
engage in an analogous shifting of earnings and assets to avoid declaring income in high tax 
countries.  The key differences are: (1) tunneling is about hiding money from public 
shareholders, while income shifting by multinationals is about hiding money from the tax 
authorities; and (2) tunneling can involve solely domestic firms.  IN both cases, however, the 
shifting of assets and liabilities among a multitude of related corporations complicates the 
workings of the firms in question and renders them less transparent to investors.   
In summary, freestanding firms are most vulnerable to divergence of interests agency 
problems if widely held and to entrenchment problems if narrowly held, though this is an 
oversimplification.  In contrast, firms in lower tiers of control pyramids are vulnerable to both 
problems simultaneously.  Their dual presence is mutually reinforcing.  Entrenchment allows a 
more fulsome divergence of interests agency problem, which raises the value of becoming 
entrenched, including maintaining the pyramidal structure and keeping family members in key 
executive positions and on key boards.  Tunneling further exacerbates both problems by allowing 
an entrenched controlling shareholder to appropriate corporate resources and to raise a corporate 
veil against outsider monitoring.   
This unhappy confluence of firm-level corporate governance problems means that less 
able managers who particularly value control are especially likely to be locked into positions of 
corporate power, and that inefficient investment might plausibly be associated with control 
pyramids.7  If these problems are isolated incidents, any macroeconomic effects are marginal.  
                                                 
6 In practice, the process of tunneling might well destroy part of the wealth being transferred, so the controlling 
owner might net less than the full million dollars because of lawyers fees, payments for discrete financial services, 
and the like.  We return to this point below.   
7  One might expect poor corporate governance to raise a firm’s outside capital costs.  The issue, however, is 
complicated.  A firm’s cost of outside capital is affected by many factors.  Pyramidal groups might have capital 
market power so that their firms’ costs of outside capital might even be lower than those of stand alone firms.  For 
example, pyramidal firm groups might be more favored clients of banks than stand alone firms because of their 
sheer size, or the pyramids themselves might contain banks.  The prevalence of pyramidal groups has implications 
on capital market conditions and hence on the overall allocation of outside financing in an economy.  We revisit 
these issues below.   
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Indeed, pyramid firms with poor corporate governance ought to be out-competed, and their 
neglected investment opportunities ought to be appropriated by better-run firms.  However, if 
control pyramids allow a very small number of controlling shareholders to amass control over so 
many firms that they govern a substantial part of the corporate sector, their sub-optimal behavior 
might aggregate to a macroeconomics problem. 
 Whether these problems outweigh any positive effects associated with pyramidal control 
is unclear a priori.  Corporate governance problems might plausibly be expected to dominate in 
situations where the controlling shareholder is less able, entrepreneurial, or honest.  The 
beneficial effects listed earlier in this section might plausibly dominate where entrepreneurial 
talent is scarce, market institutions are weak, bankruptcy costs high, and so on.  The actual 
balance is thus an empirical question.   
 
D.  Empirical Evidence 
We now review a large literature that helps us answer this question.  While some of this work 
focuses on freestanding firms, it nonetheless allows us to make carefully guarded inferences 
about control pyramid firms.  While a rapidly growing body of work also focuses specifically on 
pyramid firms, further effort along these lines is likely to be highly productive.   
 
Firm-Level Studies of Performance 
As mentioned above, Khanna and Palepu (2000a) and Khanna and Rivkin (2001) both find that 
firms belonging to pyramidal groups in developing countries outperform independent firms on 
average.  This could be due to any of the explanations listed above for business groups having an 
advantage. 
 Friedman et al. (2003) present evidence consistent with transfers of wealth from 
controlling shareholders benefiting public shareholders in pyramid firms.  They describe both 
specific instances of pyramid controlling owners “propping up” firms to the benefit of their 
public shareholders during the Asian Crisis of the 1990s and econometric results consistent with 
this occurring on an economically important scale.  They propose that, under some 
circumstances, controlling owners credibly promise to prop up distressed group firms in order to 
attract external debt financing.  This is essentially a special case of the internal capital markets 
hypothesis, described above.  Nonetheless, Baek et al. (2004) report that pyramid firms tightly 
controlled by wealthy Korean families exhibit worse stock market performance than 
independents during the crisis.  Indeed, Graham (2003), Kang (2002), and many others document 
the history of scandal, political rent-seeking, and bailouts that characterizes Korean pyramidal 
groups.     
 
The Empirical Importance of Entrenchment Problems 
Entrenchment problems are clearly important in the United States, and are likely to be even more 
important in other countries.  The first empirical evidence now recognized as indicative of 
managerial entrenchment is Johnson et al. (1985), who report that stock prices often rise 
significantly upon the announcement of CEO sudden deaths.  This suggests that CEOs often stay 
in office when they might better contribute to their firm’s value by retiring.  They presumably do 
this because they enjoy private benefits of control.  Morck et al. (1988) also report large and 
significant value discounts for U.S. firms with large shareholders, and for U.S. firms established 
more than thirty years ago and run by founders or their relative.  They interpret both findings as 
evidence of managerial entrenchment.  Slovin and Sushka (1993) relate the abnormal return upon 
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CEO sudden deaths to the departed manager’s equity stake and confirm the importance of 
entrenched management in narrowly held U.S. firms.   
 While these studies use U.S. data, and therefore refer to freestanding firms, it seems 
likely that similar entrenchment problems exist elsewhere.  This is because the United States has 
a well developed corporate takeover market, sophisticated institutional investors, and litigious 
shareholders, all of whom are likely to work hard at dislodging entrenched corporate insiders.  
La Porta et al. (1998) present evidence that these pressures are almost surely much weaker in 
most other countries – especially Civil Law countries, in which pyramids and dominant family 
shareholders are generally quite important.  Understanding why these differences exist, and the 
role of legal systems in them, would be of great value.   
 A low sensitivity of top manager turnover to firm performance may also indicate 
entrenchment.  Here, evidence more directly related to family control pyramids is available.  
Volpin (2002) shows that, when the controlling shareholder is also the CEO, CEO turnover is 
largely unrelated to firm performance.  Interestingly, within control pyramids, he finds that 
family members are replaced less often than professional managers, and that their sensitivity of 
turnover to performance is significantly lower than that of non-family CEOs.  Brunello et al. 
(2003) reports a similar result – CEO turnover is elevated in poorly performing Italian firms only 
if the CEO is not affiliated with controlling shareholder.   
 Although it seems plausible that entrenchment is more pervasive in countries with more 
extensive family control pyramids, further work is needed to make this conclusion unequivocal.  
At present, we must rely on country and case studies that may not be directly comparable.  For 
example, Filatotchev, Wright and Bleaney (1999) document Russian managers’ remarkably 
blatant efforts to entrench themselves.  De Jong and Veld (2001) argue that Dutch mangers are 
profoundly entrenched. Ugurlu (2000) argues that managerial entrenchment is pervasive in 
Turkey.  
 Unfortunately, comprehensive cross-country studies that could decide the matter are not 
yet available.  Studies across large numbers of countries comparing the determinants of CEO 
turnover would be highly useful.  Studies using data for other countries that rerun the Perez-
Gonzales (2002) analysis of the stock price reactions to family versus professional CEO 
succession would also be highly useful.    
 
Valuing the Private Benefits of Control  
We argued above that entrenchment frees corporate insiders to extract private benefits of control 
more energetically, and that pyramids may magnify the available benefits.  It is therefore useful 
to asses the magnitude of private benefits of control in different countries and for different sorts 
of firms and owners.    
 A way to measure corporate insiders’ private benefits from control is to estimate the 
value the market attaches to control rights.  If this value is positive, market participants believe 
that the controlling party obtains benefits over and above those that are shared with public 
shareholders.  This is evidence of entrenchment.  In the absence of entrenchment, these benefits 
would be ephemeral (and their value close to zero), for public shareholders would react by 
selling to a raider or supporting dissidents at a shareholders’ meeting.  Persistent large private 
benefits of control imply both a divergence of interest and insider entrenchment.   
 There are two ways to measure the value of control.  One is to infer it from the block 
premium, defined as the difference between the price per share paid in a block transaction and 
the market price after the transaction.  This premium is a lower bound on the value the acquirer 
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places on control.  An early example of this methodology is Barclay and Holderness (1989), who 
study block premiums in the U.S.  Dyck and Zingales (2003) apply the same methodology across 
a sample of thirty-nine countries by examining 412 control transactions between 1900 and 2000.  
Their results, summarized in Table 3, show that the value of control ranges from minus four 
percent to sixty-five percent, and averages fourteen percent of firm value.  In countries where 
block premiums are larger, Dyck and Zingales (2003) find that capital markets are less 
developed, minority shareholders have fewer legal rights, and law enforcement is uncertain.  
Interestingly, they also find that non-legal factors, such as more diffuse ownership of the press, 
stronger product market competition, and higher levels of tax compliance are related to lower 
block premiums.  Indeed, these factors have at least as much explanatory power as the legal 
measures.  
 The other method for estimating the private value of control is based on the difference 
between the market prices of different classes of stock.  In many countries, firms have more than 
one class of common shares.  Public shareholders invest in a class of shares, called restricted 
voting shares, with one or sometimes no votes per share.  The controlling owner holds super-
voting shares, which bestow superior voting rights.  Such structures allow the controlling owner 
to command a majority of votes in the shareholder meeting while owning relatively few shares.  
Both classes of shares sometimes trade in public equity markets.  Because only the shares with 
superior voting rights need be purchased in a sale of control, they ought to command a value 
premium if control provides private benefits.   
 This methodology has been applied to different single countries in different studies, 
however, this makes the results difficult to compare.8  Nenova (2003) uses this technique for 
eighteen countries using comparable 1997 data on 661 firms with such dual class shares.  In 
doing this, she controls for the probability of a sale of control, block-holding costs, and dividend 
and liquidity differences between the share classes to estimate a lower bound on the private 
benefits of control.  The estimates she reports, also shown in Table 3, vary from near zero for 
Finland, and less than 4% of firm value in Canada, Denmark, Hong Kong, Sweden, and the 
United States, to over 50% of firm value in Brazil, Chile, France, Italy, South Korea, and 
Mexico.  Nenova’s (2003) regressions show that the control premium is significantly lower in 
countries with stronger protection for outside investors’ property rights, and finds that sixty-eight 
percent of the cross-country variation in the value of control-block votes is explained by her 
measures of investor rights. 
 The techniques of Dyke and Zingales (2003) and Nenova (2003) are potentially very 
useful approaches to determining private benefits of control.  Much more work could be done 
along these lines.  For instance, both studies are cross sectional.  Work on how these measures 
vary over time in response to institutional changes, legal reforms, and the like would be of great 
value.   
 
Entrenchment, Private Benefits of Control, and Pyramids 
We argued above that controlling owners of pyramidal groups of listed companies are most 
likely to sacrifice the interests of public shareholders in firms low in their pyramids, for the 
controlling owner’s cash flow rights in these firms are minimal.  Several empirical studies 
present evidence consistent with such an effect. 
 
                                                 
8 See Rydqvist (1996) and Bergstrom and Rydqvist (1990 and 1992), for Sweden; Levy (1992) for Israel; Lease, 
McConnell, and Mikelson (1983) and Zingales (1995) for the US; Zingales (1994) for Italy, etc. 
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Table 3   Estimated Private Benefits of Control in Different Countries Measured as 
Block and Voting Premiums and Expressed as Percentage Premium over 
Market Value 
 
Country 
Block 
Premium a 
Voting 
Premium b Country 
Block 
Premium a 
Voting 
Premium b 
Argentina 27  Netherlands 2  
Australia 2 23 New Zealand 3  
Austria 38  Norway 1 6 
Brazil 65 23 Peru 14  
Canada 1 3 Philippines 13  
Chile 15 23 Poland 11  
Colombia 27  Portugal 20  
Czech 
Republic 
58  Singapore 3  
Denmark 8 1 South Africa 2 7 
Egypt 4  South Korea 16 29 
Finland 2 -5 Spain 4  
France 2 28 Sweden 6 1 
Germany 10 10 Switzerland 6 5 
Hong Kong 1 -3 Taiwan 0  
Indonesia 7  Thailand 12  
Israel 27  Turkey 30  
Italy 37 29 United 
Kingdom 
2 10 
Japan -4  United States 2 2 
Malaysia 7  Venezuela 27  
Mexico 34 36    
a. Block premium is average across control transactions of the difference between the price per share paid for 
the control block and the exchange price two days after the announcement of the control transaction, 
dividing it by the exchange price two days after the announcement and multiplying the ratio by the 
proportion of cash flow rights represented in the controlling block and expressed as a percentage premium.  
See Dyck and Zingales (2003), Table 2, for details. 
b. Voting premium is average of estimated total vote value as a percent of firm value.  See Nenova (2003), 
Table 5, for details.   
 
 Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (2002) examine 1996 data on 1,301 publicly traded 
corporations in eight East Asian economies – Hong Kong, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand.  Their sample is 37% of the 3,544 publicly traded 
firms in those countries.  The study shows that firm value, measured by market to book ratio, 
rises with the cash-flow rights of the largest shareholder and falls as the control rights of the 
largest shareholder exceed its cash-flow rights. The latter result is especially pertinent, for the 
primary reason for control rights to diverge from cash flow rights in these countries is pyramidal 
groups.  This result is thus consistent with controlling owners having less concern for 
maintaining the value of firms lower in their control pyramids. 
 Joh (2003) reexamines this issue using data from Korea, a country whose corporate sector 
is heavily dominated by large family controlled pyramidal groups, or chaebol.  Using data on 
5,829 publicly traded and private firms from 1993 through 1997, Joh finds a higher excess of 
control rights over cash flow rights associated with lower profitability.  Again, this is consistent 
with controlling owners having less regard for the financial performance of firms lower in their 
pyramids. 
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 Lins (2003) uses 1995 data on 1,433 firms from eighteen emerging markets to study large 
equity blockholders.9  He reports that two thirds of insider controlled firms belong to control 
pyramids, and that insiders’ voting rights average 2.7 times their cash flow rights in those firms.  
Regressions controlling for firm size, investment rate, leverage, and country show firm values to 
be depressed in proportion to the excess of insider blockholders’ control rights over their cash 
flow rights.10   This is consistent with more pronounced agency problems in firms in lower tiers 
of control pyramids.  
 Johnson, Boone, Breach, and Friedman (2000) point out that the controlling owners’ 
diversion of resources may depend on the anticipated future need for outside financing in each 
firm in a control pyramid or other group.  When future investment opportunities are 
unexpectedly curtailed, trimming the need for internal funds, a controlling owner may prefer to 
siphon off the funds rather than pay them out to investors in that firm.  This is a specific 
empirical prediction that identifies insiders’ tendency to pursue self-interest while balancing 
against repercussions, and therefore is a rather convincing empirical test.  Mitton (2002) 
compiles a sample of 398 firms in five East Asian countries and finds that firm performance 
during the 1997-1998 East Asian financial crisis – a period when investment opportunities in that 
region abruptly shrank – is only marginally affected by the divergence between cash flow and 
voting rights.  However, Lemmon and Lins (2003) find a stronger result.  They use a dataset of 
800 firms in eight East Asian countries during the 1997-1998 financial crisis.  After controlling 
for size, beta, debt to assets ratio, and market-to-book ratio, they find stock returns of firms in 
which ultimate owners control rights exceed their cash flow right to be ten to twenty percentage 
points lower than those of other firms.  For firms in which insiders have below median control 
stakes, or in which the largest block holder is not an insider, performance is independent of 
insider’s control rights relative to their cash flow rights. 
 The above empirical studies, which provide evidence on the relationship between 
entrenchment and private benefits of controls within pyramidal structures, are mostly based on 
East Asian countries that have relatively weak and corruption-prone institutions, at least 
according to La Porta et al. (1998).  Unfortunately, comparable investigations using data from 
countries with more developed legal and other institutions, such as Western European countries, 
are lacking.  This is an exciting area for further work.   
 
Tunneling 
We argued above that tunneling might serve as an especially effective way for entrenched 
controlling shareholders to extract private benefits of control.  The studies discussed above that 
link the excess of a controlling owner’s control rights over his cash flow rights to depressed 
financial performance or firm value are consistent with either tunneling or a simple neglect of the 
interests of public shareholders in lower tier pyramid firms.  Direct evidence of the relative 
cross-country importance of tunneling is yet to be gathered.  However, country studies again 
provide evidence that tunneling can be economically important.   
 The findings of Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan (2002) concerning Indian family 
control pyramids, which they call business groups, are consistent with tunneling and are difficult 
to explain with any other hypothesis.  They divide firms into free-standing firms, many of which 
                                                 
9 These countries include Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Czech Rep,, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, Peru, 
Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan (China), Thailand, and Turkey.   
10 Firm value creation or destruction is measured by high or low Tobin’s average q, respectively.  Average q is 
approximated by market value of equity plus book value of liabilities scaled by total assets.   
 30
have controlling families, and firms belonging to family control pyramid groups.  Their focal 
dependent variable is cash flow which is defined as earnings before depreciation, interest, and 
taxes over assets.  Using data from 1989 to 1999 and regressions controlling for the controlling 
owner’s cash flow rights and firm size, they find that control pyramid firms’ cash flows are less 
sensitive to own industry factors than are those of freestanding firms11  This sensitivity to own 
industry factors is lower among firms in which the controlling owner’s cash flow rights are lower 
(relative to the group median).  In addition, group firms’ performance is positively associated 
with the industry factors of other affiliates in which the controlling owner’s cash flow rights are 
low.  Interestingly, positive cash flow shocks in the lower tier firms are echoed by positive 
shocks in upper tier firms’ cash flows, but that the converse is not true.  A positive shock to a 
low cash flow rights firm’s industry increases the cash flow for high cash flow rights affiliates 
about twice as much as for low cash flow rights affiliates.  Thus, firms in which the controlling 
owner’s cash flow rights are highest – that is, firms located nearest the apex of the pyramid - 
benefit the most from a positive shock to firms elsewhere in the group.  This is consistent with 
the controlling owner transferring net resources from low from lower to higher tier firms in the 
control pyramid – that is, with tunneling.   
 Bae, Kang, and Kim (2002) also report direct evidence of tunneling in Korean family 
controlled pyramids, or chaebols.  Chaebol, while basically pyramidal in nature have extensive 
reciprocal holdings as well as simple pyramidal intercorporate ownership links.  They ask 
whether chaebol firms benefit from acquisitions they make, or whether such benefits appear 
instead in firms in higher tiers of the pyramid.  Using data on 107 mergers involving eighty-
seven firms between 1981 and 1997, they find that when one firm buys another in the same 
chaebol, the acquirer’s stock price falls but the stocks of other firms in the same chaebol rise.   
The authors argue that the controlling owner typically has lower cash flow rights in the acquirer 
than in the target, for which the acquirer typically overpays.  Intra-chaebol acquisitions thus raise 
wealth away from firms whose cash flows accrue more to public shareholders and up towards 
firms whose cash flows accrue more to controlling families.  This is consistent with tunneling. 
 
E.  Summary and implications 
In this section we showed that family control pyramids allow the simultaneous presence of 
divergence of interests agency problems, of the sort discussed by Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
and entrenchment agency problems, of the sort discussed by Stulz (1988).  This means family 
control pyramids are potentially subject to worse agency problems than freestanding firms.  This 
is because divergence of interest agency problems are most likely at their worst in widely held 
freestanding firms, while entrenchment problems are most likely at their worst in narrowly held 
freestanding firms.  Lower tier firms in family control pyramids potentially suffer from both 
problems simultaneously.  The controlling owners of pyramid firms can easily have cash flow 
rights as small as those of the professional managers of widely held firms, while exercising 
voting rights sufficient to deter any control challenge, thereby entrenching their control. 
 While divergence of interest and the entrenchment problems are well understood in the 
corporate finance literature, pyramids potentially aggravate agency problems by increasing the 
likelihood that firms are afflicted with both problems simultaneously.   
                                                 
11  Industry performance is an assets weighted average cash flow across each industry.  Cash flow is profits before 
depreciation, interest and taxes.  Each firm’s industry factor is inner product of this ratio times a vector reflecting the 
distribution of its assets is across industries.   
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 This unwelcome reinforcement of agency problems might be especially unpropitious if 
less able managers who particularly value “control” become the controlling owners of pyramidal 
groups.  Since, effectuating family control over pyramidal groups frequently involves assigning 
family members to key executive and board positions, and to corporate boards, corporate 
governance power may often be based on family ties and ability to protect the controlling 
family’s interests, rather than ability.  The overall consequence is that these firms may 
underperform from an asset utilization viewpoint.  Finally, the lack of effective external 
monitoring in pyramid firms whose governance is dominated by a powerful family may deprive 
even scrupulous managers of effective investor feedback regarding investment decisions12.   
 
VI.  Implications of Control Pyramids 
So far, we have analyzed problems that arise in individual firms in a pyramid by focusing on the 
controlling shareholder’s behavior.  In this section, we broaden the scope of the survey and 
review the literature on the implications for the economy as a whole of a few old, established 
families controlling a substantial fraction of the economy through large pyramidal groups.  This 
is an especially timely topic, for many emerging and transition economies are in the first stages 
of establishing patterns of ownership over large corporations.  Intriguingly, control pyramids 
seem quite popular in these countries.  For example, Cull, Matesova and Shirley (2002) describe 
Czech control pyramids.  However, research on the development of pyramidal group dominance 
is only beginning, and much more work is needed. 
 We shall first describe capital allocation problems associated with established pyramids.  
We shall argue that, even if established pyramidal groups allocate capital efficiently internally, 
the overall allocation of capital across pyramidal group boundaries can still be inefficient.  
Moreover, this problem can be exacerbated if pyramidal groups have capital market power.   
 Second, extending the above arguments leads to the possibility that an economy with 
extensive established pyramidal structures may undertake less innovation.  Because of biased 
capital allocation, upstarts may have difficulties raising finance; and thus invest less in 
innovation.  Also, pyramidal group firms might invest less than is socially optimal in innovations 
that might compete against the current products of established group firms.  Intriguingly, 
tunneling might actually mitigate this last effect, for the controlling owner can benefit from 
innovation if she can tunnel the gains towards firms in which her cash flow stake is large while 
leaving the negative effects of creative destruction to public shareholders.   
 Finally, we speculate that the prevalence of pyramidal structures is associated with an 
economy-wide under-supply of external capital.  This speculation is based on the premise that a 
lack of corporate transparency reduces public investors’ expected overall return.  If this 
depresses overall domestic savings as well as the supply of capital from abroad, upstart firms’ 
liquidity constraints could be more binding than otherwise.  We hasten to reiterate that this is 
speculative, and that further research is needed. 
 All these issues point to pyramidal groups controlled by established families being 
associated with slow economic growth.  
 
A.  Capital Allocation Problems 
We now consider how the allocation of capital across the boundaries of pyramidal groups might 
be distorted even though capital is efficiently allocated within each group.  While this problem is 
                                                 
12 See Durnev et al. (2004).  
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most likely aggravated if pyramidal group controlling owners have capital market power, it can 
occur under competitive capital markets too.   
 
External Allocation Problems 
Almeida and Wolfenzon (2003b) propose that physical capital might be over-used within 
conglomerates and business groups, in that more productive applications outside of the groups 
are forgone.  Their argument suggests that, even if physical capital is efficiently allocated within 
a group, the economy-wide allocation of capital might still be inefficient, in that groups have less 
incentive to relinquish productive assets to outside users than is socially optimal.  
Their intuition is that, in an economy with poor investor protection, public shareholders 
rationally expect insiders to appropriate part of the return on corporate investments.  Consider an 
economy in which some existing projects must be liquidated.  A family owning such a project, 
and controlling no other firms, has no option but to lend the capital released in this liquidation to 
the outside entrepreneur with the highest productivity.  However, if the family controls other 
firms, capital allocation can be distorted.  This is because the family earns the full return when it 
reinvests the capital within the group; but expects only a fraction of the return when it invests in 
a firm controlled by someone else.  Thus, the family may decide to allocate the capital within the 
group even if the productivity of an outsider’s project is higher.   
Almeida and Wolfenzon propose that the internal capital market in corporate groups may 
not even be a second best alternative from a social perspective.  Indeed, they deduce that the 
more efficiently capital is allocated within a conglomerate or group, the greater the likelihood 
that capital is misallocated overall. 
 
Capital Market Power 
Section III.D showed that the large corporate sectors of many countries are made up of a few 
large pyramidal groups and scatterings of independent firms.  Morck, Stangeland, and Yeung 
(2000) suggest that, due to their sheer size relative to the rest of the economy, large pyramidal 
groups might attain a degree of price setting power in their domestic capital markets.   
To avoid confusing the current argument with the Almeida and Wolfenzon (2003b) 
argument above, we assume away all information and agency problems between lenders and 
users of capital.  This eliminates any possibility of capital market underdevelopment due to 
institutional inadequacy.  Now, assume that a pyramidal group has a surplus of capital so large 
that it has a considerable “market share” in the supply of capital.  The group would supply 
capital for internal and external use until the two alternatives generated identical marginal 
returns.  For an internal application, the marginal return is the simple marginal return on capital.  
However, the marginal return for the external alternative reflects a downward sloping capital 
demand schedule, which is the external users’ marginal return on capital.  The marginal return of 
capital in an internal application is thus less than the external users’ marginal return.  In other 
words, the group provides too little capital to external users at too dear a price.    
Along this vein, additional considerations arise.  First, outside investment might erode the 
controlling owner’s capital market power, as outsiders accumulate wealth from their 
investments.  Hence, when supplying capital to external users, a thoughtful controlling owner 
considers this negative effect, which is absent when supplying capital to internal users.  This 
should induce group firms to charge external users of capital more than internal users.  Second, 
gradations might arise in the cost of capital within the pyramid related to the controlling owner’s 
cash flow rights in each firm.     
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In the alternative case, where the pyramidal group has insufficient capital for its internal 
needs, its sheer size could give it monopsony “market power” in the sourcing of external capital.  
This, through a precisely symmetric set of arguments to those outlined above, induces the group 
to use too little capital and to pay too low a rate of return to the providers of external capital.   
 
Relationship Banking Problems 
Pyramidal groups often contain major commercial, investment, merchant, or universal banks as 
member firms.  For example, one branch of the Canadian Bronfman family controls Hees 
International Bancorp, a large merchant bank, and the Swedish Wallenberg family controls SEB, 
a large Swedish universal bank.  Sharing a controlling owner presumably lessens information 
asymmetry problems between borrower and lender firms, and so allows firms in a pyramidal 
group preferential access to bank financing.  This is a further extension of the above idea of 
business groups allocating capital among their member firms at low cost relative to alternative 
allocation mechanisms.  Having a bank as an integral part of the group’s structure is not always 
necessary, for the apex firm can serve as a de facto bank in any event.  Regardless, it is 
instructive to consider the implications of group banks within the framework of the relationship 
banking literature.   
A borrower having a relationship with his bank mitigates information asymmetry 
problems and thus eases liquidity constraints, as in Peterson and Rajan (1994).  However, Rajan 
(1992) also shows that such a relationship locks a borrower into a long-term bond with its bank.  
This is because, once the relationship is established, switching banks sends a negative quality 
signal about the borrower to other prospective lenders.  This makes the borrower vulnerable to 
“hold-up problems”.  If the bank and borrower firm are in the same control pyramid, and so have 
the same ultimate owner, both information asymmetry and hold-up problems might be mitigated.   
Even if the bank is not a member firm of the pyramid, these considerations might still 
remain.  The share of the rent arising from the relationship that the bank captures depends on the 
outside opportunities and respective market power of both the bank and the borrower.  For 
example, a larger borrower with more outside financing alternatives should be able to keep a 
greater share of the relationship rent.  Likewise, if the bank’s profits are more dependent on 
retaining the pyramid firms as borrowers, its share of relationship rent falls.  Family control 
pyramids containing more corporate assets ought thus to be better able to retain relationship rents 
than smaller stand alone firms.   
In either case, pyramid firms would enjoy cheaper access to capital, all else equal.  
Indeed, banks might appear to discriminate against freestanding firms. 
 
Empirical Evidence 
At present, little empirical work examines capital allocation within and between family 
controlled pyramidal groups, or capital allocation across group firms and freestanding firms.  
Morck, Stangeland, and Yeung (2000) report that Canadian firms controlled by old money 
families have elevated capital-labor ratio after controlling for industry, firm size, and firm age.  
Consistent with this, Attig, Fischer and Gadhoum (2003) find that Canadian firms affiliated with 
pyramidal groups have greater capital expenditures than comparable non-affiliated firms.  
Moreover, the higher the controlling owner’s cash flow stake, the more elevated the capital 
expenditure.   
The monopsony case discussed above can probably be eliminated as a description of the 
Canadian economy, for it predicts, at least in its most naïve form, that group firms ought to use 
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less capital than other firms, which is not observed.  However, any or all of the other capital 
allocation distortions might be occurring in that country.   
Further work on other countries is also clearly needed for potentially valid a priori 
arguments can lead in either direction.  For example, Khanna (2000) argues cogently that the 
Tata pyramidal group of India is social welfare enhancing because it substitutes for imperfect 
capital markets in that country and thus allows entrepreneurs to obtain financing that would 
otherwise be unavailable.  This has to be pitched against the Almeida and Wolfenzon (2003b) 
argument that groups may inefficiently concentrate capital.  The nature of pyramidal groups’ 
effects on the allocation of capital is thus, in the final analysis, an empirical issue.    
Consequently, further empirical investigation along these lines is likely to be quite 
interesting.  The relative capital intensity of pyramidal group versus freestanding firms in other 
countries is not known.  Likewise, studies comparing levels of internal utilization of retained 
earnings in pyramidal groups versus freestanding firms would be highly useful.  Finally, and 
perhaps most difficult, evidence on macroeconomic capital intensity and reinvestment of 
earnings across economies with different incidences of old, established family groups would be 
desirable.  Each of these exercises would, of course, require an “all other things equal” baseline.  
This means further thought is needed regarding necessary controls beyond the obvious ones, 
such as industry, and time fixed effects.   
 
B.  Depressed Investment in Innovation 
Innovation is an especially interesting type of investment in an economy of control pyramids.  
Schumpeter (1912, 1942) is now generally acknowledged as correct in arguing that growth is a 
process of creative destruction.  Growth requires the continual creation of innovations based on 
new technology or a recombination of old technologies, with technology broadly defined to 
include scientific, managerial, and other practices important to a firm.  Yet, innovations also 
cause the destruction of firms built around activities rendered obsolete.  Schumpeter (1912) 
points out that innovators seldom have access to large flows of retained earnings, and that 
innovation consequently usually requires outside financing.  This suggests that innovation ought 
to depend on the existence of functional capital markets and institutions, a hypothesis empirically 
verified by King and Levine (1993).  Alternatively, Schumpeter (1942) proposes that large firms 
with ample cash flows from previous investments might best be able to finance innovation.  
More broadly, innovation requires that innovators have access to capital.   
Morck et al. (2000) develop a special case of this argument.  They argue the destruction 
intrinsic to innovation is often an externality to a freestanding firm, but that this is less likely for 
a large control pyramid.  In an economy of freestanding firms, a maker of superior plastic pipes, 
who takes business away from copper pipe makers, bears none of the costs associated with the 
declining copper industry.  Even if some investors hold stocks in both businesses, competition 
between investors insures that the plastic pipes venture can be financed as a stand alone entity.  
In an economy of control pyramids, where the copper pipe maker and plastics company have the 
same controlling shareholder, financing for the plastic firm’s innovation may be less 
forthcoming.  The controlling shareholder may see little net advantage in letting her plastics 
company disrupt her copper company.  Morck et al. (2003) call this problem creative self-
destruction.13  Even if the plastics firm is not part of a group, the controlling owners of 
pyramidal groups containing steel companies might exert whatever capital market power they 
                                                 
13 In a somewhat similar vein, Acemoglu and Robinson (2002) argue that elites historically sometimes blocked new 
and efficient technologies to avoid changes that threatened their political power.   
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command to deny financing to the upstart plastics maker.  Certainly, the controlling owner has 
little incentive to cooperate with the innovator to form a commercial alliance, and might even 
seek to expropriate the innovation to slow the pace of its application.   
Intriguingly, tunneling within pyramidal groups might actually mitigate the problems 
associated with creative self-destruction.  This is because creative destruction might proceed 
apace if the controlling shareholder can tunnel away profits from the creative innovation and 
leave public shareholders to absorb the costs of the “destruction” of firms with obsolete 
technology.  Thus, freer tunneling might actually reduce dynamic inefficiencies.  Thus, stronger 
public shareholder rights might impede innovation by curtailing tunneling, but might also 
accelerate innovation by deepening financial markets, which King and Levine (1993) argue lets 
entrepreneurs establish new firms to develop their innovations.  Thus, while family control 
pyramids ought to be related to a slower pace of innovation, the interaction of this effect with 
stronger public shareholder rights is difficult to predict.   
Finally, it is important to note that the above need not apply to all pyramidal or other 
groups.  For example, De Long (1990) argues that the J. P. Morgan group in the late 19th and 
early 20th century United States was instrumental in financing numerous innovative ventures, and 
in lending its financial credibility to entrepreneurs.   Empirical work is needed to determine 
which outcome is more economically important and under what circumstances.   
Only the most preliminary empirical work tests these ideas.  Morck et al. (2000) report 
that firms controlled by old, established Canadian families spend less on R&D than other 
Canadian firms and than similar US firms, controlling for industry, firm size, and firm age.  They 
also report that countries with larger billionaire inherited wealth over GDP have lower private 
sector R&D spending.  Given the importance of innovation to economic growth, further work on 
the investment policies, R&D strategies, capital intensity, and liquidity constraints of firms with 
different ownership structures is clearly a priority.   
 
C. Overall Capital Market Effects   
So far, the discussion in this section has focused on firm-level effects regarding capital access 
and investment decisions.  However, these firm level effects might easily attain macroeconomic 
proportions in economies where a few old families control the greater part of the corporate 
sector.  Also, by affecting the nature of capital markets, extensive pyramiding might directly 
affect macroeconomic outcomes.   
 For example, a prevalence of pyramidal groups in a country’s corporate sector might 
render the average firm more opaque to outside investors, both domestic and foreign, and this 
might induce both to place their savings elsewhere.  This might be a direct effect, arising out of 
the increased complexity of accounting in large groups of firms.  It might also be indirect, in that 
the controlling owners of large pyramidal groups might press government officials to maintain 
ineffective shareholder protection and weak disclosure rules to better facilitate tunneling.     
 The opacity of business groups could have macroeconomic implications through reduced 
liquidations of low productivity firms.  Kim (2004) shows that a bank has more difficulty 
inferring the quality of members of a business groups than of stand alone firms, after observing 
loan payments.  This is because inter-group loan guarantees prevent the bank from knowing 
whether the payment is from the borrower or from other firms in the group.  Consequently, the 
bank is more likely to liquidate a freestanding firm than an otherwise identical group firm. 
 These admittedly entirely speculative hypotheses suggest testing whether or not a high 
prevalence of pyramidal groups relates to an under-supply of external capital in an economy.  
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Moreover, how severely liquidity constraints impede the growth of upstarts might depend on the 
precise mechanism involved.  If pyramids per se render their member firms more opaque, 
freestanding firms might be at an advantage in raising external capital.  However, if controlling 
owners press for weak institutions, this might especially constrain upstart firms.  Weak investor 
legal rights and poor disclosure ought conceivably to make it harder for good upstart firms to 
signal investors about their quality.     
 Along these lines, Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) argue that the misappropriation of 
wealth by controlling shareholders raises overall costs of capital to the corporate sector, and thus 
impedes growth.  Lombardo and Pagano (2002) argue that aggravated information asymmetry 
problems in economies with weak institutions move demand and supply schedules for capital so 
as to reduce both the aggregate amount of capital used and social welfare.  Castro Clementi, and 
MacDonald (2003) propose that strengthened property rights for public investors can have a two-
fold effect.  On the one hand, stronger legal rights raise public investors’ level of trust and so 
lower the cost of capital to entrepreneurs.  On the other hand, stronger investor property rights 
reallocate wealth from controlling families to the middle classes.  If ordinary investors have a 
lower propensity to save, this might actually reduce the overall level of savings in the economy.  
Castro, Clementi, and MacDonald (2003) develop an overlapping generations model that 
magnifies the latter effect by positing that stronger investor rights reallocates capital from the 
younger generation of entrepreneurs to the older generation of retirees, and that the latter have a 
minimal propensity to save.   
 Empirical work to test these theories, and to develop stylized facts within which future 
theories in this are must fit, is clearly important.   
 
D.   Summary 
This and the previous section show that the effects of control pyramids on corporate governance 
might well be especially injurious in countries that provide public shareholders ineffective legal 
rights against malfeasance by corporate insiders.  These governance problems, allowed free 
reign, plausibly retard macroeconomic performance for three reasons.  First, the adverse effects 
of a single poor manager become a macroeconomic problem if she controls a pyramid that 
includes a substantial fraction of a country’s corporate assets.  The structure of a control pyramid 
also leads to a variety of capital allocation distortions.  By altering the overall investment level 
and by skewing the distribution of capital expenditure across groups, firms, and projects; these 
distortions can compromise economic growth.  Second, control pyramids might adversely affect 
investment in innovation because they cause an internalization of the disruptive effects of one 
firm’s innovation upon another.  This, especially, might be a powerful growth retardant.  Third, 
the concentration of capital within pyramidal groups may negatively affect public investors’ 
required returns because of the opacity of control pyramids.  The distribution of returns to 
different classes of investor may also affect the overall supply of savings because of difference in 
their propensities to save.  
 The regulation of capital markets and institutions in general, and of corporate governance 
in particular, are ultimately functions of a country’s political process – see e.g. North (1991).  
We therefore turn to the interaction of control pyramids with political economy in the next 
section.  
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VII.  Political Economy Considerations 
While inequality exists in virtually every country, we showed above that control pyramids can 
magnify large inequalities in wealth into truly enormous inequalities in economic power.  
Control pyramids effectively entrust the corporate governance of the greater parts of the 
corporate sectors of many countries to handfuls of elite, established families, who can quite 
reasonably be described as oligarchs.  The extent to which this concentration of corporate 
governance power occurs can be used to arrange capitalist economies along a metric with two 
stylized endpoints.  One endpoint, diffuse capitalism, best approximated by the United States and 
United Kingdom, is characterized by numerous professionally managed freestanding large 
corporations, each owned by small investors whose property rights are well protected by 
effective laws.  The other endpoint, oligarchic capitalism, approximated by most East Asian and 
Latin American economies, is characterized by public investors holding minority voting stakes in 
large corporations that are controlled by a few families through control pyramids.   
In this section, we consider this metric more closely in a framework of political economy, 
the discussion of which we have postponed until now.  We propose that oligarchs have strong 
incentives to lobby politicians and public servants for policies that preserve the status quo.  
These policies include the limitations on public investors’ rights discussed in the previous 
section, as well as high barriers to entry and international trade and capital barriers.  We propose 
that these policies can best be thought of as political economy outcomes due to the relative 
strength of oligarchs’ political influence.   
Political influence by oligarchs, then, leads to policies that preserve and expand their 
corporate governance power, which preserves and expands the resources at their disposal for 
further political lobbying.  We argue that this self-sustaining feedback loop makes oligarchic 
capitalism highly stable.   
Although the extreme concentration of corporate governance power characteristic of 
oligarchic capitalism may seem undesirable per se to some, it might nonetheless be economically 
efficient.  We argue that this is unlikely because the weak shareholder rights, barriers to entry, 
and trade and capital flow restrictions often associated with oligarchic capitalism are known to 
be associated with poor long-run macroeconomic performance.  Indeed, these problems may well 
explain why Morck et al. (2000) find that economies with larger inherited wealth post slower 
growth.      
Finally, the concepts we develop in this section is really quite general.  Although we 
focus on family control pyramids, the broader issues – who allocates capital and how hard it is to 
replace them – can attain macroeconomic importance under certain institutional arrangements.  
Family control pyramids are one such arrangement.  But the professionally managed keiretsu 
groupings of Japanese corporations might be another, as Morck and Nakamura (1999) argue.  
Yet another might involve an entrenched elite of bureaucrats presiding over inefficient state-
owned enterprises, as in Krueger (1993).  See also Megginson and Netter (2001).   
 
A.  Economic Entrenchment 
We define an economy as exhibiting economic entrenchment if it has a highly oligarchic flavor 
of capitalism and exhibits signs of enduring economic inefficiency.14  Thus, oligarchs who 
allocate resources economically efficiently do not qualify as entrenched.  Likewise, temporary 
                                                 
14 Note that this is deliberately distinct from managerial entrenchment in corporate finance, where suboptimal 
managers cannot be ousted and the performance of the firm suffers.  We view economic entrenchment as a 
macroeconomic counterpart to this, and a potentially much more important problem.   
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economic inefficiency, due to poor government policies or poor corporate governance that are 
soon corrected, is also not indicative of entrenchment.  We envision economic entrenchment as 
characterizing oligarchic capitalist economies that exhibit a sustained inefficient use of resources 
– and of capital in particular – that benefits vested interest at the expense of the rest of the 
economy.   
There are many possible reasons why oligarchic capitalism might allocate resources more 
or less efficiently than diffuse capitalism.  If the oligarchs are especially adept at business, they 
may excel at placing resources where their values are highest.  Indeed, this might underlie the 
finding of Morck et al. (2000) of high growth in countries in which great wealth is concentrated 
in the hands of self-made billionaires.  But if oligarchs were poor managers, the concentrated 
corporate governance in oligarchic capitalism could magnify the mistakes of a few individuals 
into macroeconomic problems.   
Wurgler (2000) shows that sound capital institutions and markets, especially shareholder 
legal rights, effectively check capital misallocation – presumably including that by corporate 
insiders running control pyramids.  He measures the quality of capital allocation by the 
propensity of capital to flow to high value-added sectors, and demonstrates a strong positive 
correlation between this variable and measures of public shareholders’ legal rights against 
corporate insiders.  The measure of public shareholders’ rights he uses is from La Porta et al. 
(1997b, 1998), who add up distinct legal rights – the right to vote by mail, the right to sell shares 
prior to meetings, the right to cumulative voting, the right to sue directors, pre-emptive rights to 
new issues, and the right to call extraordinary shareholder meetings.   
The “Law and Finance” literature, which descends from La Porta et al. (1997b, 1998), 
argues more broadly that how well capital markets function depends on a range of customs, 
rules, laws, and regulations, and on how vigorously they are enforced.  Thus, statutory 
shareholder rights are largely meaningless if the judiciary, police, and regulators are all deeply 
corrupt.  While legal rights for public shareholders are clearly an important determinant of how 
well capital is allocated, other considerations factor in as well.  These include a general absence 
of corruption, transparent accounting and disclosure, and many other dimensions of institutional 
development.  Ultimately, a pervasive respect for outsiders’ private property rights seems basic 
to an efficient allocation of capital.   
This respect must engender not only rights for public investors, but also rights for 
aspiring entrepreneurs.  Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002) document the 
difficulties entrepreneurs confront in becoming registered business firms in many poor countries.  
These include expensive, arbitrary, and repeated inspections, taxes, and fees relating to “safety 
and health,” the environment, labor, and “screening.”  They show that the time and direct cost of 
these procedures as a fraction of 1999 per capita GDP, as well as their sheer number, is 
significantly positively correlated with measures of government corruption.  Such arbitrary 
barriers to entry deter prospective entrepreneurs and lock in control by insiders.  We count such 
impediments as infringements on entrepreneurs’ private property rights.   
For expository convenience, we refer to all of these rights together as private property 
rights.  The degree to which the private property rights of public investors and entrants are 
protected, both from the government and from more powerful individuals, depends on 
government policies – their stipulation and enforcement.  Although economics long regarded 
government policies as exogenous except in limited areas – such as taxes, monetary policy, and 
fiscal policy – recent work, such as Krueger (1993), Olson (1982, and 2000), favors treating 
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government policies as thoroughly endogenous; in particular, they depend on political influence, 
or lobbying.15   
The “law and finance” literature discussed above points to a clear importance of 
countries’ legal systems in explaining the development of their financial systems.  Further work 
is needed to understand the operational nature of this effect, as well as the historical interplay of 
individual countries’ legal systems and economies.  Extending this literature, determining its 
limitations, and filling in its missing pieces are all attractive areas for further theoretical and 
empirical work.   
 
B.  Political Influence in Oligarchic Capitalist Economies  
There are a number of reasons for believing that oligarchic families are likely to be highly 
effective political lobbyers, especially when they control large pyramidal groups of companies.  
In particular, Morck and Yeung (2003) argue that the apex shareholders of control pyramids 
have particularly low political lobbying costs.    
One reason they stress is that the controlling owners of great pyramidal groups command 
vast economic resources, from which they can readily make up-front side payments to public 
officials.  In contrast, new entrants, usually short of capital, must promise future side payments 
for advantageous government policies now.  Since many new ventures fail, or are taken over by 
others, such promises are risky investments for a public official.  Thus, the controlling owners of 
great pyramidal groups have lower lobbying costs than the principals or professional managers 
of new entrants have.   
 A second set of reasons has to do with lower transactions costs.  The controlling owner 
can pool the resources of many companies to make side payments to politicians without the 
coordination costs a similar array of freestanding firms would incur.  An array of freestanding 
firms would also surely experience some free-rider problems, while an array of pyramid firms 
with a common controlling owner need not.   
Moreover, Olson (1982) argues that larger or more diverse groups of people have higher 
transaction costs in organizing effective lobbying.  Control pyramids concentrate corporate 
governance rights over vast sweeps of many countries’ economies among handfuls of wealthy 
families.  The number of oligarchs is small and the transaction cost of coordinating their actions 
is correspondingly low.  This makes coordinating the lobbying of different oligarchs easier.   
Yet another reason oligarchs’ transactions costs might be low is that politicians might 
perceive them as more trustworthy partners in favor trading.  Favor trading between political and 
corporate insiders often involves trading actions today for promised future responses.  The 
beneficiary of today’s action has an ex post incentive not to pay up.  The C.E.O.s of widely held 
firms in the United States last an average of seven years on the job – an eye blink compared to 
the permanence of the old money families controlling corporate pyramids in many countries.  
One CEO of a widely held firm may feel little obligation to uphold promises made by a 
predecessor.  In contrast, a dynastic family can better keep faith over time.  Likewise, an oligarch 
should discount promised future consideration from a public official at a lower rate than that the 
                                                 
15 For example, Krueger (1993) argues that import substitution programs generate groups which include bureaucrats, 
firms, and individuals whose fortunes grow under the programs, and who gain political power, and then defend the 
programs to protect their vested interest.  The result is a vicious cycle of poorer and poorer economic growth.  She 
pitches that against a virtuous cycle in which export oriented program breeds defenders of export oriented policies 
and economic growth gets better and better.  She advocates paying attention to the political-economics dynamic 
interactions. 
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professional manager of a widely held freestanding firms would use.  Finally, officials should be 
less willing to break faith with the controlling owner of a great pyramidal group, for she would 
have means to “punish” the defecting official, given her extensive corporate governance powers.  
Thus, the controlling owners of pyramids have lower lobbying costs than the professional 
managers of widely held freestanding firms.   
A third set of reasons why oligarchs’ lobbying costs are likely to be especially low 
involves their use of tunneling to transfer resources among controlled firms.  For example, the 
controlling owner could trade payments to politicians from lower tier firms for favors that benefit 
higher tier firms.  In this way, public shareholders pay the group’s lobbying costs while the 
controlling family reaps the benefits of lobbying.  That is, the controlling owner need sacrifice 
personal or family wealth equal to only a small fraction of the actual side payments.  By 
coordinating where the costs and benefits of political rent-seeking fall among pyramid firms, the 
controlling owner can effectively tunnel wealth from one firm to the other without directly 
transferring assets or income between firms.  Moreover, to render favors to government officials, 
the controlling family of a pyramid can tunnel resources to where the payment can be made most 
discretely – perhaps a private firm or a firm in an industry with little government business.  That 
means constraints on the specific form favors to officials can take are less restrictive for 
oligarchs than for the principals or managers of freestanding firms.   
Finally, corporate insiders and political insiders may be the same people, or at least from 
the same families.  This may be the result of effective past lobbying, but it surely also facilitates 
further cooperation between oligarchic families and the State.   
Such ties are surprisingly prevalent.  Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000, p. 109), citing 
the New York Times (Sept 8 1998, p. 2) report that “the business empire of the Suharto (the 
previous strong man in Indonesia) family is thought to control 417 listed and unlisted companies 
through a number of business groups led by children, other relatives, and business partners, 
many of whom also have held government offices” and describe how Imelda Marcos, the widow 
of former Philippines president Ferdinand Marcos, explains that her relatives “practically own 
everything in the Philippines from electricity, telecommunications, airlines, banking, beer and 
tobacco, newspaper publishing, television stations, shipping, oil and mining, hotels and beach 
resorts, down to coconut milling, small farms, real estate and insurance” (Financial Times, Dec 
8, 199, p. 16).  The Chief Executive of Hong Kong was the offspring of a shipping tycoon, and 
Kashing Li, who controls some large pyramidal groups, allegedly maintains a considerable stake 
in the Chief Executive’s family business.  The Lee family provided Singapore a head of state for 
decades, while also managing many of its businesses.  The Appendix to Johnson and Mitton 
(2003) describes the close ties of the Mahathir family, Daim Zainuddin (a previous finance 
minister) and Anwar Ibrahim (a purged vice prime minister) with Malaysian businesses.  Former 
Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin is a large shareholder of Gazprom.  Faccio (2003) 
provides other abundant examples.      
Nor are such connections restricted to emerging market countries.  Faccio and Lang 
(2002) report that two members of the Agnelli family, which controls the largest Italian 
industrial group, serve Italy as members of parliament.  Silvio Berlusconi, who controls another 
of the same country’s largest pyramidal groups, serves Italy as Prime Minister.  And Francois 
Pinault, the controlling shareholder of Pinault-Printemps-Redoute, Grand Bazar de Lyon, Rexel, 
and Zodiac, is reputedly a close friend of French President Jacques Chirac.16.  Paul Desmarais, 
the controlling shareholder of one of Canada’s largest pyramidal groups, is also a closely related 
                                                 
16 About on going stories, see, e.g., Financial Times, Dec 6, 2003, “Heat on Chirac for Public Inquiry.”  
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in-law of former Prime Minister Jean Chrétien and the longtime business associate of the current 
Prime Minister, Paul Martin.    
Faccio (2003) examines these relationships formally by carefully documenting family ties 
between the political and corporate leaders of forty two different countries.  She reports that 
firms representing 7.76% of the world’s market capitalization are run by relatives of their 
countries’ political leaders.  While there is no hint of corruption in many of these family ties, 
others presumably result from political influence and lower the costs of further lobbying.   
Indeed, political influence might be instrumental to owners’ private benefits of control.  
Faccio (2003) shows that, after controlling for endogeneity, politically connected companies 
enjoy easier access to debt financing, lower taxation, and higher market shares.  She also 
demonstrates that announcements of directors or dominant shareholders entering politics or of 
politicians joining boards result in a significant increase in firm value when companies operate in 
highly corrupt countries.  De Soto (1989), Shleifer and Vishny (1993, 1994), and others argue 
that such political connections give firms preferential access to government subsidies, financing 
from government owned enterprises and banks, tax breaks, and exemption from burdensome 
regulations.   
This is not to suggest that political lobbying is an unimportant corporate investment in 
diffuse capitalist economies like the United Kingdom and United States.  A huge literature, in its 
modern form descending from Stigler (1971), attests to the near universal importance of political 
rent-seeking.  Indeed, many of the arguments listed above suggest that large family firms might 
also have a political rent-seeking advantage in diffuse capitalist economies.  For example, the 
Financial Times (Feb. 26, 2004, p. 8) quotes a “former US government trade official” as being 
impressed with Cargill, a huge private US family agribusiness because “They weren’t simply 
looking in a short sighted way at the bottom line, but had an eye on the longer term.  It made me 
more and more inclined to listen to them for trade negotiations.”  Econometric evidence on 
which sorts of firms are best at political rent seeking is scant.17 
Our point here is not that diffuse capitalism is free of political rent-seeking, but that 
oligarchic capitalism, because of pyramidal corporate control and the other factors described 
above, narrowly concentrates and greatly magnifies political rent-seeking power in the hands of a 
tiny elite.   
Furthermore, Morck and Yeung (2003) show that there is a strong correlation between 
corruption and family control.  Using 1995 family control data from La Porta et al. (1999) and 
indices about corruption, they produce the following table. 
Extensive lobbying power in the hands of a country’s leading business families might 
seem a recipe for strong private property rights, but Morck et al. (2000), Glaezer et al. (2003) 
Rajan and Zinglaes (2003), Sonin (2003), and others argue that this is far from clear.  Glaezer et 
al. (2003) posit that the very wealthy can prefer weak property rights when they benefit from the 
transfer payments that weakness allows.  Shleifer (1997) points out that, in economies with poor 
general property rights protection, the wealthy often invest in private protection of their property 
rights.  If this has a fixed cost, the wealthy prefer continued private enforcement of their property 
rights and an absence of property rights protection for others.    
                                                 
17 Though see Lenway et al. (1996).   
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 Table 5  Measures of the Return to Political Rent Seeking and the Incidence of Family Firms 
 Simple Correlation Coefficients   
Regression Coefficients                     
controlling for log of 1995 per capita GDP    
  Incidence of Family Control in 1995 in   Incidence of Family Control in 1995 in    
  Twenty Largest Firms  Ten Middle-size Firms   Twenty Largest Firms  Ten Middle-size Firms    
         
  
20% 
Threshold
10% 
Threshold  
20% 
Threshold
10% 
Threshold   
20% 
Threshold
10% 
Threshold  
20% 
Threshold
10% 
Threshold  Sample
Control Concentration            
0.313      0.357 0.108 0.157  0.418 0.529 0.079 0.154  27 Incidence of pyramidal holding company 
structures (0.11) (0.07) (0.59) (0.43)   (0.13) (0.07) (0.77) (0.56)   
Tax System Corruption 
         
  
[0.03] [0.07] [-0.07] [-0.06] 
   
-0.470 -0.444  -0.472 -0.270   -0.889 -0.588 -0.732 0.470  25 Higher scores indicate general compliance 
with tax laws (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.19)  (0.32) (0.54) (0.40) (0.57)    
Political System Corruption            
[0.28] [0.26] [0.27] [0.26] 
   
-0.414 -0.438  -0.526 -0.523   0.367 0.188 -1.05 -0.980  27 Higher scores indicate a general absence of 
official corruption (0.03) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01)  (0.73) (0.87) (0.31) (0.33)    
Judicial System Corruption            
[0.49] [0.49] [0.51] [0.51] 
   
-0.340 -0.375  -0.457 -0.426   0.501 -0.691 0.292 -0.036  27 The efficiency and integrity of the judicial 
system, particularly as it affects business  (0.08) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03)  (0.56) (0.55) (0.78) (0.97)    
Civil Service Corruption            
[0.55] [0.55] [0.55] [0.55] 
   
-0.663 -0.685  -0.722 -0.630   -2.64 -2.59 -2.83 -1.82  27 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.07)    
High scores indicate bureaucrats have 
"autonomy" and the “strength and expertise to 
govern”      [0.70] [0.69] [0.73] [0.66]   
Regulatory Barriers to Entry            
0.521 0.501 0.578 0.424  0.195 0.160 0.218 0.080  27 Estimated regulatory compliance cost of 
starting a new business, as % of GDP (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.03)  (0.12) (0.23) (0.06) (0.50)   
      [0.36] [0.33] [0.39] [0.30]   
Numbers in parenthesis are probability levels for the null hypothesis of a zero simple correlation or a zero coefficient on oligarchic family control 
in regressions of each rent-seeking variable of that variable and the logarithm of 1995 per capita GDP.  Numbers in square brackets are 
regression adjusted R2 statistics.  
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Entrepreneurial ability, like other dimensions of intelligence, is likely to be at most only 
partially hereditary.  On average, the entrepreneurial ability of oligarchic family scions ought to 
regress steadily towards the population mean with each successive generation, as modeled by Caselli 
and Gennaioli (2003).  Yet an oligarch with little entrepreneurial ability still commands all the 
political lobbying advantages enumerated above.  Thus, older billionaire families should be 
progressively more drawn towards using political influence, rather than entrepreneurship, to sustain 
their economic positions.  Sonin (2003) makes an argument in connection with transition economies 
that parallels ours in some ways.  A first generation of entrepreneurs in many transition economies 
became wealthy through adept rent-seeking, rather than genuine entrepreneurship, and therefore 
favors weak general property rights enforcement because this facilitates their continued rent seeking.  
By using their political influence to lock in their own corporate governance power, 
economically entrenched oligarchs thus also lock in on-going suboptimal capital allocation.  This is 
partly because hereditary oligarchs are simply likely to possess limited ability as entrepreneurs.  In 
part, it also reflects the corporate governance problems intrinsic to the control pyramids that provide 
oligarchs with vast rent-seeking influence.  It also reflects the incentives oligarchs have to suppress 
innovations that threaten the value of their existing capital that were discussed in the previous 
section.  And the lobbying for entry barriers and the like that lock in oligarchs’ governance powers 
can also have side effects that further distort capital and other resource allocation.   
 
C.  Formalizing the Flavors of Capitalism  
We argued above that different countries apply different versions of capitalism, ranging from the 
oligarchic capitalism of many Latin American countries to the diffuse capitalism of the United States 
and United Kingdom.  In the previous section, we proposed that oligarchs in the former version of 
capitalism might use the political process in their countries to entrench themselves.  In this section, 
we formalize this reasoning.   
Wealthy families might lobby for stronger private property rights, including shareholder 
rights that promote financial development.18  We take financial development to mean greater 
functional form efficiency of the financial system, as defined by Tobin (1982)19.  Intuitively, a more 
developed, or more functionally efficient, financial system is one that better allocates capital to its 
highest value uses.  Greater financial development would let wealthy families sell out, or raise 
outside capital, on more advantageous terms.  But wealthy families might also lobby for institutions 
that enhance and protect their private benefits of control, weakening the private property rights of 
others and retarding financial development.  Public investors, in contrast, unambiguously prefer 
strong private property rights protection since the main effect of weak rights is worse predation by 
oligarchs.  Potential entrepreneurial entrants likewise prefer strong private property rights because 
this lets them raise funds from public investors on better terms.   
                                                 
18 We deliberately adopt a narrow view of property rights related to financial development; however, a broader view may 
also be sensible.  For instance, a class of top professional managers might become “entrenched” by setting up takeover 
defenses and undermining shareholder democracy.  Or, as Krueger (1993) argues, government activism might lead to the 
development of a class of bureaucrats that “entrenches” to preserve its influence and economic power.  Of course, large 
interventionist government, pursuing social objectives other than economic efficiency, might deliberately sacrifice 
investors’ property rights and financial development to those ends – even without entrenched bureaucrats.  If these other 
forms of entrenchment, or big government per se, are correlated with family control pyramids, this could confound the 
framework we develop below.     
19 Levine (1997) gives a more extensive list of the functions of financial markets: mobilizing savings, allocating 
resources, exerting corporate control, facilitating risk management, and easing trade in goods, services, and contracts.  
Tobin’s definition is more in line with this survey’s focus.  
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Whether economic entrenchment ensues or not thus depends upon which way the oligarchs 
opt.  Moreover, since we showed above that oligarchs likely have vastly more lobbying power than 
other segments of the economy, their wishes may well predominate in public policy discussions. 
Conceptual framework 
This can be formalized somewhat, along lines developed in Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002).  Public 
shareholders expect some “stealing” by corporate insiders, so external financing is more expensive 
than internal financing.  Thus, an entrepreneur seeking external financing must compensate investors 
for her expected thievery up front, in the form of a low share price in the initial sale of equity to the 
public.  Consequently, the entrepreneur uses internal cash if possible, and considers external 
financing only to top this off when necessary.  Better private property rights reduce actual and 
expected thievery by insiders, and thus reduce the cost of external capital.  This makes more 
investment projects viable for entrepreneurs.  The result is faster economic growth.   
The level of private property rights is controllable by the government – either by altering the 
rights on the books or by varying the enthusiasm with which they are enforced.  This means the 
government can determine capital market functionality.  By raising the level of private property 
rights, it can therefore generate faster economic growth. 
Consider a simple stylized political economy model with the following cast of players:  First, 
there are political insiders who value both economic growth and side payments.  The side payments 
can be outright bribery, campaign contributions, or anything in between.  Second, there are corporate 
insiders, who control on-going business operations with considerable internal cash.  Third, there are 
outsiders, who include both public investors and potential innovative entrepreneurs.  We assume the 
political insiders and corporate insiders each act as one.  In contrast, there are a very large number of 
outsiders, each with a small amount of cash, who cannot act collectively.  Outsiders supply their 
savings to capital users competitively.  Some outsiders wish to become entrepreneurs, and are 
possibly more able that the corporate insiders currently entrusted with corporate governance.   
Consider a bargaining equilibrium among political insiders, corporate insiders, and potential 
entrepreneurial entrants.  For simplicity, suppose there are only two levels of private property rights: 
strong (S) and weak (W).  The maximum side payment the corporate insiders are willing to pay to 
the political insiders is the difference between their wealth in states W and S.  An analogous 
constraint applies to each outsider.  This is a minimally binding constraint for the corporate insiders, 
for pyramids might allow them to use assets they control, rather than their own wealth, to pay bribes. 
The political insiders’ utility is a weighted average of the side payments received and economic 
growth, which is higher if shareholder protection is strong. 
Define an equilibrium as a level of private property rights such that  
 
1. The political insiders’ utility at the equilibrium is higher than at the other level.  
2. Neither the corporate insiders nor the outsiders are willing and able to pay side payments to 
the political insiders sufficient to induce a change in the private property rights regime.   
 
If the corporate insiders lobby for strong private property rights, they can sell their capital 
assets to more able entrants, who can more readily raise the necessary funds from public investors.  
This permits the old corporate insiders to fade away into a comfortable retirement.  Moreover, as 
strong private property rights are implemented, the value of private benefits of control, including 
those due to pyramids, falls.  This limits corporate insiders’ ability to make side payments, and thus 
limits their political influence, reinforcing their decision to sell out.  (Assuming side payments are 
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financed out of current cash flow.)  All of this combines to create pressure towards less oligarchic 
and more diffuse capitalism.   
In contrast, if the corporate insiders lobby for weaker property rights, and the attendant 
higher private benefits of control, they set the stage for economic entrenchment.  Policies that 
compromise investor rights raise oligarchs’ private benefits of control, providing them with more 
resources to lobby further.  This presumably results in pressure towards more oligarchic and less 
diffuse capitalism.   
This example is highly simplified in that it allows only two levels of private property rights 
protection, S and W.  In fact, private property rights protection is a multidimensional phenomenon 
that certainly can take more than two values.  However, two values suffice to make our basic point:  
Economic entrenchment is but one possible equilibrium.  There can be others – perhaps many others 
– in a more nuanced model.  This suggests that previous work, such as Morck et al. (2000) and Rajan 
and Zingales (2003), may be excessively pessimistic in focusing too single-mindedly on the weak 
shareholder rights equilibrium.  Nonetheless, that work clearly captures important aspects of the 
political economies of many countries, especially those that entrust corporate governance to 
pyramids controlled by a few old moneyed families.     
Establishing the equilibrium is non-trivial.  However, some intuitive considerations must 
apply.  Any deviation from a pre-existing level of private property rights has several effects: 
 
1.   Any improvement in private property rights transfers wealth from existing users of capital to 
existing providers of capital.  The opposite occurs if private property rights fall.  We call this 
the transfer effect. 
2.   Any improvement in private property rights reduces the cost of external capital, and thus 
raises capital investment by both corporate insiders and outsider entrepreneurs.  The opposite 
is true when private property rights are downgraded.  We call this the cost of capital effect.  
The cost of capital effect is positive for outsiders when private property rights are 
strengthened and negative when they are downgraded.  For corporate insiders, the cost of 
capital effect from stronger private property rights is positive if they need outside capital and 
zero if they do not.  The cost of capital effect for corporate insiders from reduced private 
property rights protection is negative if they have insufficient internal capital, but zero if they 
need no external funds.   
3.  A change in private property rights changes the number of outsiders who become 
entrepreneurs and undertake investment projects.  This is because stronger private property 
rights lower their costs of external capital and make more projects viable.  This creates 
product market competition for the firms controlled by corporate insiders.  It also creates 
capital market competition, as today’s entrepreneurs have more wealth to invest in the future.  
And it allows creative destruction to proceed, which erodes the value of the corporate 
insiders’ existing capital assets.  This competition effect is negative for corporate insiders if 
private property rights grow stronger, and positive if they grow weaker.    
 
These considerations belie any simple predictions about the relationship between the level of 
private property rights and the corporate insider’s welfare.  Morck, Stangeland, and Yeung (2000) 
and Rajan and Zingales (2003) assume that weaker private property rights always benefit the 
corporate insider.  That is, they presume that the transfer, cost of capital, and competition effects 
combine to generate a net increase in the corporate insider’s welfare when the private property rights 
regime switches from S to W.  This is likely a special case, albeit an important one, for the sum of 
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the effects can be the opposite.  For example, if corporate insiders’ future investment needs greatly 
exceed their internal cash, the cost of capital effect might be sufficiently negative to overwhelm the 
positive transfer and competition effects.  In this case, the corporate insiders and the outsiders concur 
on the need for stronger private property rights. 
Rajan and Zingales (2003) point out that many countries that currently have small stock 
markets had large and dynamic stock markets a century ago – a phenomenon they call the great 
reversal.  They propose that, in these countries, a first generation of corporate insiders raised money 
from public investors and then lobbied for policies that caused financial market atrophy, or at least 
stood by while ideologues enacted them.  This weakening of private property rights was to their 
advantage because they no longer needed outside capital.  In our terminology, the “cost of capital” 
effect faded, and the “transfer” and “competition” effects dominated.  They call their idea an interest 
group theory of financial development, which parallels our concept of economic entrenchment.  In 
essence, Rajan and Zingales (2003) propose that the preferences of the first generation of corporate 
insiders regarding investor property rights protection changed as the insiders aged – or that their 
heirs had markedly different preferences.   
This reasoning, while perhaps historically plausible, highlights a time inconsistency problem.  
Rational public investors should have anticipated this volte-face.  Expecting a future erosion of 
shareholders’ property rights, they should have been loath to provide the first generation of 
entrepreneurs with capital on generous terms.  This objection can be circumvented in several ways.  
First, public shareholders make mistakes and learn from experience.  The statutory property rights 
protection most great reversal countries provided their first generation of public investors was weak, 
and public investors may have learned from experience not to offer equity capital on generous terms.  
Alternatively, the erosion may have been uncertain, for investors might have expected the enactment 
of strong property rights.  Finally, public investors might have expected the erosion to occur many 
years down the road.  Perhaps the expected present value of insider expropriation at the time of the 
initial provision of finance was small.  Such issues highlight the difficulty of constructing fully 
rational expectations equilibrium models of institutional development.   
A simplification in our conceptual framework is that outsiders always prefer strong private 
property rights because the transfer and cost of capital effects are both positive for them and the 
competition effect is irrelevant.  This may not be entirely realistic if organized labor prefers job 
security for members over general economic growth, as Roe (2003) and Högfeldt (2003) argue is the 
case in social democracies like Sweden.  However, in such countries, we might think of organized 
labor as insiders too.   
This, and all other simplifications in this section, highlight the need for rigorous theoretical 
development of this area, and for careful empirical work to guide theory.  Developing models that 
formalize different flavors of capitalism is a fascinating uncharted territory for creative theorists.   
 
D:  Determinants of Economic Entrenchment  
Economic entrenchment is a self sustaining, stable equilibrium that seems to characterize some, but 
not all oligarchic capitalist economies.  The stark divergence between high and low income 
economies appears to result from the latter becoming trapped in a weak property rights regime 
characterized by economic entrenchment.  This begs the questions of what determines whether or 
not any particular country falls into an economic entrenchment trap.  We believe this to be a 
fundamental economic problem.  
To determine whether or not economic entrenchment occurs, we must consider the 
circumstances under which the corporate insider is willing and able to pay the political insider 
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sufficient side payments to reduce property rights protection, or to refrain from upgrading low 
protection, and outsiders are unable or unwilling to offer large enough side payments to oppose this.  
We propose three fundamental determinants: the nature of the investment opportunities available, 
the country’s political, legal, and cultural traditions, and the country’s openness to the global 
economy.  We shall argue that oligarchs’ lobbying preferences depend on the sorts of investment 
opportunities that are available to the oligarchs.  We then argue that politicians’ weighting of the 
public interest against personal gain depends on factors like the skewedness of the wealth 
distribution, legal and cultural traditions, and more ephemeral factors like democracy and openness.    
 
Opportunities and Traditions 
That the investment opportunities open to the oligarch help determine her lobbying preferences 
follows from the framework described above.  There, we argued that the corporate insider is more 
able and willing to pay large side payments to political insider to implement weak private property 
rights if her existing operations generate larger cash flows and her future investment needs are less.  
In our terminology, the transfer effect is large, for large cash flows mean the corporate insider has 
abundant opportunities to appropriate wealth.  To sustain these cash flows, the corporate insider 
views the competition effect associated with high private property rights as a negative.  Also, the 
corporate insider has abundant internal cash to finance future investment, so the cost of capital effect 
is minor.  Thus, the nature of the investment opportunities open to previous generations of oligarchs 
is a prime candidate as an explanation for current levels of property rights protection. 
 All else equal, lobbying by oligarchs should be more effective if political insiders value side 
payments more and economic growth less.  In the stylized example above, this weighting is inherent 
in the parameters of the political insiders’ utility function, though this is a vast over-simplification.  
Enumerating the likely determinants of the weights politicians assign to the public interest versus 
their personal gain requires further reflection.  This relative valuation most plausibly depends on the 
country’s political, legal, and cultural traditions.  
Certainly, economic entrenchment in most modern countries implies an explicit or tacit 
collusion between public officials and the controlling owners of pyramidal groups.  The objective of 
this collusion is policies that benefit established controlling owners, even at the cost of suppressing 
overall economic growth.  Collusion can sometimes be difficult to sustain, as when members of a 
cartel “cheat” by undercutting each other secretly.  However, collusion persists in other cases, such 
as trade protectionism and, we argue, oligarchic capitalism.  As noted above, oligarchs are likely to 
be especially effective at lobbying for a variety of reasons.  Because of this, they are likely to benefit 
more than the general citizenry from worse levels of official corruption.   
The political insider’s preferences presumably depend on the costs and benefits of taking 
bribes.  An absence of democratic accountability, a high general level of corruption, a controlled 
press, and an ignorant, illiterate, and impoverished citizenry probably all can shift this balance 
towards accepting bribes.  Of course, all of these factors are also outcomes, potentially caused by 
economic entrenchment.  For example, Glaezer and Shleifer (2003) describe a “Curley Effect” in 
Boston politics, whereby its Irish-American Mayor James Michael Curley used wasteful 
redistribution and inflammatory rhetoric to drive more affluent and educated Anglo-Saxon voters out 
of Boston, thereby cementing his political control.  Nonetheless, many authors argue persuasively 
that these sorts of factors are historically rooted and therefore exogenous in fundamental ways.    
 However, it is important to allow that such factors can also be endogenous, for this underlies 
a critical characteristic of entrenchment – its stability.  The current cash flows to which the corporate 
insider has access, and the future cash flows her further investments might generate, certainly 
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depend, to some extent at least, on exogenous “initial conditions”.  Corporate insiders with more 
experience in rent-seeking than in genuine entrepreneurship, as in some transition economies, might 
tend to favor weak property rights because these let them play to their advantage, inducing what 
Hellman et al. (2003) call state capture – the acquisition of control over the organs of the state by 
corporate oligarchs  If such initial conditions induce weak institutions, these may well further limit 
future investment opportunities and alter political leaders’ concern for the public interest.  A path 
dependence ensues that may well lock in economic entrenchment.    
 Recent work provides considerable empirical evidence supporting this general reasoning.  
Nonetheless, much work remains, and this is likely to be an exciting avenue of future research.   
 Solokoff and Engerman (2000) propose such an argument based on a review of the economic 
history of the Americas from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century.  They point out (p. 221) that 
plantation economies like the Barbados, Cuba, and Jamaica, which “specialized in the production of 
sugar and other highly valued crops associated with extensive use of slaves had the highest per 
capita income in the New World” in the sixteenth century, including slaves in the calculation.  “The 
greater efficiency of the very large plantations and the overwhelming fraction of the populations that 
came to be black and slave made the distributions of wealth and human capital extremely unequal.”  
“The long-run success and stability of the members of these elites (white plantation owners) were 
also facilitated by their disproportionate political influence.  Together with the legally codified 
inequality intrinsic to slavery, the greater inequality in wealth contributed to the evolution of 
institutions that protected the privileged, even after the abolition of slavery.”  
 A second category is Spanish America.  These economies had valuable mineral resources and 
abundant native labor with low human capital.  The Spanish colonial master built on pre-conquest 
social institutions, whereby Indian elites extracted tribute from the general population, to develop 
huge landholdings controlled by a small elite.  This system locked in the status of the earliest 
settlers, who became formal representatives of the Spanish Crown, while restricting further 
settlement.  The result is a highly unequal distribution of political and economic power.   
 In both of these categories of economies, institutional development was directed towards 
protecting the economic and political power of entrenched oligarchs, for example by limiting 
democracy, and limiting the economic and political power of the commoners, for example by 
spending little on basic public education.  This is consistent with the oligarchs’ existing investments 
generating high current cash flows, but with broader investment having relatively low returns to the 
oligarchs.  This situation induced the oligarchs, the first wave of European settlement, to favor weak 
institutions, and this further limited the returns to further investment.  The skewed wealth 
distribution that resulted from that economic system induced politicians to attach little weight to the 
interests of the common people, and thus further reinforced economic entrenchment.       
 Solokoff and Engerman (2000) contrast these two categories of economies with a third – 
British North America.  These areas, especially north of Virginia, had climates that did not favor 
large-scale plantations, and their development was based instead on small yeoman farmers and 
townsfolk of European descent who had relatively high and similar levels of human capital – 
especially after settlement displaced the fur trade.  Consequently, the areas that became Canada and 
the United States developed more egalitarian distributions of political power and institutions 
developed to provide more equal treatment and opportunities to their populations.  As well, they 
spent far more on education for the population as a whole. These colonies presented limited 
opportunities for appropriation of cash flows by the first wave of settlers, but presented investment 
opportunities that promised abundant future returns.  In this environment, the initial settlers favored 
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property rights protection and sound institutions in general.  The resulting relatively even 
distribution of wealth induced politicians to place a greater weight on the public interest.   
 Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) propose a different explanation as to how the 
initial conditions confronted by European settlers in different regions generated different investment 
opportunities and hence different property rights regimes.  They examine the economic growth of 
British colonies to ascertain why some became rich and others did not.  They argue that European 
settlers preferred institutions that enforced the rule of law and encouraged investment if they could 
survive and settle.  In places where climatic conditions led to high settler mortality, Europeans 
preferred exploitative institutions.  Taking European settlers’ early mortality rate as an exogenous 
instrument, they find that low mortality encouraged European settlement; which induced early 
institutions supportive of the rule of law, public education, etc., which underlie current institutions.  
High settler mortality fostered “extractive” institutions, which also persist.  They go on to show that 
current per capita income is higher the better the country’s current protection against state 
expropriation, and that this in turn is highly negatively correlated with early settler mortality rates.    
 In a similar vein, Easterly and Levine (1997) use African data from the 1960s to the 1980s to 
show that ethnic diversity is related to slow growth.  The idea is that ethnic fragmentation causes 
groups in power both to invest in competitive short-term “extractive” policies for fear of another 
ethnic group usurping power.  Also, ethnic diversity, or more general political fragmentation, 
reduces the consensus for funding good public goods like infrastructure, education, and financial 
regulation.  They provide robust supportive empirical evidence. 
In addition, a natural tendency towards entrenchment might emerge as a country’s 
entrepreneurs age and die.  Entrepreneurs grown older and less dynamic might become less able to 
find and undertake innovative value creating investments.  Or less capable heirs might assume 
control over great pyramidal groups, and miss opportunities their forebears would have grasped.  
Thus, the problem alluded to above and proposed in Rajan and Zingales (2003) sets in again, and 
corporate insiders come to better appreciate the advantages of weak private property rights.   
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002, 2003) extend their previous work.  Using 
urbanization to proxy for economic development, they demonstrate a “reversal of fortune” effect.  
Many countries that were relatively rich in 1500 are now relatively poor.  They argue that this is 
inconsistent with a simple geographic or climatic story.  Instead, they argue that “[i]n prosperous and 
densely settled areas, Europeans introduced or maintained already existing extractive institutions to 
force the large population and the slaves imported from Africa to work in mines and plantations.”  
“In contrast, in previously sparsely settled areas, Europeans settled in large numbers and created 
institutions of private property … [that] encourage commerce and industry.” This institutional 
development made possible the spillover benefits associated with industrialization in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries that built their current high standards of living.   
Thus, the work by Solokoff and Engerman suggests that an initial round of investment 
opportunities creates either a skewed or egalitarian distribution of wealth, and that this in turn 
provides politicians with either an apolitical peasantry or a politically active middle class, 
respectively.  The former allows politicians to place greater weight on their personal gain than does 
the later.  Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson suggest that large populations of European settlers 
transplanted institutions supportive of the rule of law and property rights.  The ensuing development 
of social and political traditions allows these institutions to persist.  These considerations suggest the 
following considerations.  
First, a tradition of democracy is probably important, see Barro (1991, 1997).  If political 
insiders are elected to office, and if outsiders substantially outvote corporate insiders, political 
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insider’s utility should attach a lower weight to side payments than would be the case in the absence 
of democracy.  Democratic traditions are the work of decades and centuries, and so are exogenous 
compared to more ephemeral economic phenomena.   
Admittedly, political systems are probably not exogenous in the long run because corporate 
insider’s lobbying targets might include the political process itself, as well as private property rights.  
Indeed, Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) and Sokoloff and Engerman (2000) argue that the colonial 
elites of Latin American countries, intent on controlling the state to control natural resources, 
actively opposed democracy to prevent the poor majority from gaining power and redistributing 
rents form these resources.  Olson (2000) and others also argue that oligarchic elites dislike 
democracy.  Rajan and Zingales (2003) suggest that the United States is largely immunized against 
economic entrenchment (which they call “an interest group theory of financial development”) 
because of its multitudinous branches of government, which provide checks and balances, and 
because of the diversity and activity of interest groups.   
Second, an efficient and independent judiciary raises the penalty for being caught accepting 
bribes, and so plausibly also shifts political insiders’ cost-benefit analysis towards greater concern 
for economic growth.  La Porta et al. (1998) and others propose that ancient legal traditions, 
established centuries or even millennia ago by colonial occupation, invasion, or economic 
domination, still influence levels of general corruption, judicial efficiency, and basic legal rights.  La 
Porta et al. (1998) echo Hayek (1960) in proposing that, in civil law countries, where the law is 
directly under state control, the elite use the law to become entrenched.  In contrast, common law 
traditions have more independent judiciaries that protect private property owners from the state20.  
See Beck et al. (2002) for empirical evidence consistent with this view. 
But a country’s legal traditions are clearly not the only factors that raise the costs of taking 
bribes.  Another institution that we believe to be important is a free and independent press.  A free 
press exposes and criticizes political insiders who value side payments more than social objectives.  
A free press also exposes controlling insiders’ extraction of private benefits.  Finally, a free press 
makes for more informed and less manipulability outsiders, and thus makes any lobbying they 
undertake more effective.  Dyck and Zingales (2002) show that an independent and free press 
mitigates theft by corporate insiders.  However, Djankov et al. (2003) show that the media virtually 
everywhere are controlled either by the State or by a few wealthy families.  Where those families are 
part of the oligarchic elite, the watchdog role of the press may be seriously compromised.  
Less quantifiable social institution also probably determines a country’s propensity for 
economic entrenchment.  For example, whether a country provides sound basic public education 
might matter.  Better educated outsiders are better able to understand and participate in political 
debates.  This presumably lowers outsiders lobbying costs relative to those of insiders.  A better 
educated populace also presumably generates more capable and politically astute outsider 
entrepreneurs.  Again, Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) and Sokoloff and Engerman (2000) argue that 
the colonial elite in Latin American actively opposed public investment in human capital to prevent 
the poor majority from gaining power and redistributing rents form natural resources.   
Even less tangible institutions, like culture and mores, may also be important.  Landes (1949) 
argues that the generally poor performance of the French economy compared to those of Germany, 
Great Britain, and the United States throughout the 19th century was caused by a predominance of 
family control in France.  He argues that French family firms were highly risk averse, and more 
                                                 
20 Another difference between civil and common laws is that the latter has greater adaptability than the former in that it 
can adjust to changing social and economic circumstances more flexibly because the interpretation of common law codes 
is based on current values.  For a discussion of the difference between civil and common laws, see Beck et al. (2002). 
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interested in survival and succession than in growth and innovation.  Thus, family businesses lobbied 
for protectionism and bailouts, and regarded the state as “a sort of father in whose arms [they] could 
always find shelter and consolation” (p. 50) with the result that overall economy is slow.  Consistent 
with this, Murphy (2004) argues that French culture places a huge weight on each generation’s 
sacred duty to pass on a patrimony to the next. Indeed, French Civil Law makes it virtually 
impossible for the patriarch of a family business to disinherit his son.   
More generally, Weber (1958), La Porta et al. (1997a), and others argue that certain religions 
are more amenable to commerce and finance than others.  Weber (1958) proposes that the Protestant 
religion, by emphasizing individual accountability, fostered a cultural shift that favored 
entrepreneurs over old-money elites.  La Porta et al. (1997a) argue that hierarchical religions, which 
they define to include Roman Catholicism and Islam, are less conducive to the growth of large 
businesses.  Like Weber, they emphasize the importance of cultural institutions that encourage 
individual initiative and cooperation among unrelated individuals.  These characteristics embolden 
outsiders and limit popular acceptance of oligarchic rule.      
 Indeed, Rajan and Zinglaes (2003) point out that the financial atrophy, or “great reversals”, 
they detect did not occur with equal intensity in all countries, and that many stock markets flourished 
through the entire twentieth century.  They propose that different political, legal, and cultural 
traditions instill different degrees of susceptibility to economic entrenchment, much as certain genes 
create dispositions towards specific infirmities given the necessary environmental triggers.   
 Further research along the lines of all of the studies discussed above is likely to generate 
exiting new insights.  We are only beginning to understand these very basic issues, which are 
fundamental not only to economics and finance, but to a whole spectrum of social sciences.   
 
Globalization 
One particularly rapidly changing aspect of the economic environment of many countries is 
openness to the global economy.  European countries are merging into an ever closer economic and 
political union, regional free trade blocks and bilateral free trade treaties are much in vogue, and 
pressure continues for further multilateral action to reduce trade and capital flow barriers.  
Globalization merits special attention here, for the persistence of economic entrenchment requires a 
degree of economic autarky for several reasons.   
 First, autarchy preserves monopoly and monopsony power in product and factor markets in 
general.  If domestic entrants can borrow abroad, list on foreign stock exchanges, or otherwise obtain 
capital from foreign investors, they can establish themselves despite ill functioning local capital 
markets and institutions.  Henry (2000a, b) reports a significant favorable impact of capital openness 
on the domestic cost of capital, and thus on investment.  Coffee (2002), Karolyi and Stulz (2003), 
Stulz (1999), and Siegel (2003) discuss how cross-listing on foreign exchanges and submitting to 
foreign regulators can credibly signal investors about firm quality.   
 Second, autarky allows better control over the pace of creative destruction.  Capital barriers 
can keep local innovators from developing their innovations, cutting into existing firms’ markets, 
and accumulating wealth.  Trade barriers can keep innovative foreign products out of domestic 
markets and thus preserve the value of existing capital assets.  Suppressing domestic innovation is of 
no value if foreign innovators can flood the market with their products.   
 Third, autarchy gives governments much greater policy freedom.  Confiscatory taxes, skewed 
regulations, inefficient subsidies, and other politically related private benefits of control are much 
harder to sustain in an open economy.  And bilateral and multilateral treaties limit governments’ 
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powers to enact such policies.  Moreover, footloose capital, skilled labor, and consumers can take 
their business elsewhere if the local economy becomes too distorted.     
Finally, locals may imitate foreigners.  Caves (1974) and a huge subsequent literature argue 
that entry by foreign multinationals raises productivity because of technology spillovers and 
heightened competition in both goods and factor markets.  Locals may also come to demand the 
same financial and political rights they see foreigners enjoying.  That is, openness may create 
popular support for institutional reform.  Local governments and regulators may be pressed to adopt 
international best practices in disclosure, governance, and regulation.    
For example, Stulz (1999) analyzes how openness alters domestic investors demand for 
better corporate governance.  Locals can learn from foreign investors the skills to seek information 
about domestic companies and to monitor performance.  Khanna and Palepu (2001) examine Indian 
firms and show that foreign investors identify better performing India firms and propose that their 
monitoring improves performance.  Active foreign investors both train personal for domestic 
investors and serve as role models.  Also, the presence of active investors raises the demand for 
information services, such as auditing and financial analysis.  And foreign investors can active a 
dormant market for corporate control.  All of this raises the net benefits to corporate insiders of 
providing good governance and lowers the cost of sending a “good governance” signal to investors.  
Thus, economic openness, the freedom of locals to do business with foreigners, ought also to 
be numbered among private property rights; and economic autarchy is probably a lobbying goal of 
oligarchs seeking economic entrenchment.   
While direct evidence of this is limited, circumstantial evidence is supportive.  Faccio (2003) 
shows that economies in which the corporate and political elites have stronger blood ties also have 
more restrictions on cross-border capital flows.  Morck et al. (2000) show that economies with more 
inherited billionaire wealth as a fraction of GDP have more restrictions on inward foreign direct 
investment.  Rajan and Zingales (2003) find greater “great reversals”, or financial atavism, in 
countries with more closed economies.  They argue that dual openness, that is trade openness and 
capital flow openness, is essential to counter the forces that undermine capital market development.  
With only trade openness, industrial incumbents press for government subsidies as well as the 
maintenance of their privileged access to capitals.  The end result is the sustained repression of 
domestic capital market development.  Moreover, they argue that capital openness requires private 
property rights, for otherwise information asymmetry continues to mar domestic capital markets, 
preventing entry by locals too small to seek foreign capital and thus sustaining the dominance of the 
local oligarchs (meaning that the foreign capital will flow to the oligarch’s companies).  Rajan and 
Zingales (2003) use exports plus imports over GDP to proxy for trade openness, international capital 
flows to proxy for capital flow openness, and measures such as equity issues, the number of listed 
companies, and stock market capitalization to proxy for financial development.  They report that 
trade openness heightens the positive impact of industrialization on financial development.  They 
also note that this impact is much more important early in the twentieth century than in its latter 
decades.  The impact disappears in the mid-century period when international capital mobility was 
limited, roughly from 1930 to the 1970s.   
Some direct evidence pertaining to changes in openness is available to support these 
arguments.  Morck et al. (2000) show that the unexpected enactment of free trade with the United 
States caused the stock prices of Canadian firms controlled by old money families to fall relative to 
other Canadian stocks in the same industries.  They also show that Canadian firms controlled by old 
money families had abnormally high capital intensity prior to free trade, but that their capital 
intensity fell to industry, firm size, and firm age corrected norms subsequent to free trade.  Johnson 
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and Mitton (2003) show that, when the Malaysian government imposed capital controls in 1998 in 
response to allegations that foreign “hot money” caused the East Asian economic crisis, the stock 
prices of firms with ties to the ruling party rose and the stock prices of other firms fell.  Their result 
suggests that capital controls create a screen for cronyism, in which the government forwards 
resources to connected firms via their policies.  However, Siegel (2003a) finds that increasing 
openness in Korea primarily expanded and strengthened that countries’ most politically connected 
firms.  Further evidence is needed to clarify the issue.   
 The arguments of Morck et al. (2000), Johnson and Mitton (2003), and Rajan and Zingales 
(2003) suggest that openness to global capital flows, as well as to international trade, ought to 
augment national economic performance.  However, other students of international finance disagree 
out of concern that capital market openness might heighten economic volatility.  For example, 
Bhagwati (1998) argues that capital market openness can spread financial crises, and Forbes and 
Rigobon (2002) study contagion as a factor in market fluctuations.  Be this as it may, avoiding 
economic entrenchment clearly counts as a serious weight on the side of the balance favoring capital 
openness.  Further work exploring this issue is likely to be of considerable value.   
 
Endowments, Institutions, and Policies 
Easterly and Levine (2003) compare the economic significance of the three broad classes of 
determinants discussed above by contrasting three hypotheses.  The first they call an “endowments 
hypothesis” – that variables like settler mortality, latitude, natural resources, and access to the sea 
matter most in explaining general prosperity.  The second, which they style an “institutions 
hypothesis”, focuses on private property rights, accountability, political stability, government 
effectiveness, regulatory burden, rule of law, and an absence of corruption.  The third, which they 
call a “public policy hypothesis”, holds that more standard economic variables like inflation, trade 
openness, and exchange rate overvaluation.  
 Using the logarithm of 1995 real per capita GDP as their dependent variable in multiple 
regressions, they report that endowments explain economic growth, with natural resources and 
mortality rate the most significant factors.  They also find that endowments help explain cross 
country variation in institutional development, with natural resources and mortality rate again the 
most significant factors; and that endowments do not explain growth except through their influence 
on institutions.  Finally, they report that policy variables do not explain growth once the institutional 
effects are accounted for. 
 The Easterly and Levine (2003) study is valuable not only for the empirical facts it provides, 
but for demonstrating how researchers can test the importance of different theoretical and conceptual 
explanations for these issues.  We anticipate a large literature developing along these lines.  
 
F.  Summary   
This section proposes the concept of economic entrenchment as a feedback loop, whereby weak 
institutions place sweeping corporate governance powers in the hands of a tiny elite, who then lobby 
for weak institutions.  We further propose that this feedback loop creates economic distortions that 
retard economic growth.  These proposals require elaboration.   
 Several core concepts underlie the idea of economic entrenchment.  First, entrusting the 
corporate governance of the greater part of a country’s corporate sector to a tiny elite, especially via 
control pyramids, gives that elite huge advantages in political lobbying.  Second, oligarchs often 
lobby for weak property rights because these increase the private benefits of control they can 
appropriate from outside investors.  Thus, the elite prefer strong private property rights only under 
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some circumstances, while the rest of the population always prefers strong private property rights.  
Third, economic entrenchment requires that political insiders see the benefits of cooperating with the 
oligarchs as outweighing the costs, despite the detrimental effects inflicted upon the populace in 
general.   
 This framework does not imply that economic entrenchment is inevitable.  The elite and the 
general citizenry might both prefer strong property rights, particularly when the future economic 
outlook is bright so that the elite need external financing.  However, the framework does suggest a 
high degree of path dependence.  An historical shock that induced economic entrenchment in the 
past could have a long lasting effect on a country’s institutional development; for once in place, 
economic entrenchment can be self-sustaining in the absence of further shocks.     
 The discussion in this section is deliberately speculative; and the subject matter is important.  
The development and preservation of institutions conducive to efficient resource allocation is a 
central issue in any market economy.  Our central idea is that economists ought to pay more 
attention to how institutional development, as a political economy issue, is related to the distribution 
of corporate control in an economy.  Corporate control provides resources and power to influence 
institutional development.  The whole body of economics suggests that such resources and power 
would be used to further the self-interest of those who wield them.  The preliminary work surveyed 
above shows that the initial distribution of economic power and the preferences for institutional 
development of the powerful both matter.  Further work to determine how they matter, and why they 
might matter more under some circumstances than under others, would be most valuable.   
 The discussion above also suggests that the development of political, legal, and cultural 
institutions plays a role in these issues.  Democracy, the rule of law, a free press, comprehensive 
public education, and individualistic cultures all raise political insiders’ potential costs attendant 
with accepting bribes from corporate insiders.  These factors are all thus conducive to the 
development of strong property rights protection for investors, and hence to capital market 
development.  The literature, while still developing, suggests that conditions deep in a country’s 
economic history that strengthened or weakened these sorts of institutions might either lock 
oligarchic capitalism and economic entrenchment into place or open the way to rapid economic 
growth and more diffuse capitalism.  The extent to which corporate control and the political 
influence it engenders are path dependent is of great interest, for on this question turn issues 
regarding economic development strategies, and the most basic economic issue of all – why some 
countries are rich and others poor. 
 Recent work, notably Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002, 2003), Engerman and Sokoloff (1997), 
Easterly and Levine (2003), Rajan and Zingales (2003), highlights the importance of an initial 
distribution of economic power, the preferences of those exercising it, and the path dependence of 
institutional development.  Still, the research agenda is long and far from complete.  We know little 
about which is more important – initial conditions or elite preferences.  We know little about how 
that balance varies across countries and over time.  Much important work remains undone.   
 We speculate that the preferences of entrenched elites regarding institutional development 
depend on their expected future need for broader cooperation – for example in tapping external 
financing to undertake future economic opportunities.  But further work is needed to confirm this, 
and to clarify the tradeoffs involved.  The success of those entrusted with corporate governance 
powers in influencing institutional development doubtless depends on existing institutions – social, 
political, judicial, and educational institutions.  These determine the effectiveness and nature of 
successful lobbying strategies as well as the payoffs available to political insiders.  In turn, these 
social, political, and judicial institutions are surely endogenous.  We have severely limited 
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theoretical and empirical understanding about the actual mechanics of how these interactions play 
out.  Further work – conceptual, theoretical, and empirical – is needed. 
 For example, while we are beginning to understand the importance of legal traditions in 
determining the property rights of outside investors, we have little understanding of other ways in 
which legal traditions might matter.  For example, we have barely scratched the surface in learning 
how different legal systems affect the distribution of corporate governance powers and the 
development of social, political, judicial, and educational institutions, not to mention the 
complicated interactions between these factors,  Yet all of these almost certainly affect the political 
economy equilibrium, which determines property rights institutions among other things.   
 Better knowledge about the strategic alternatives and their payoffs to the political economic 
game players in these interactions would be very useful.  For example, Dyck and Zingales (2002), 
Djankov et al. (2003), and others shows that the mass media are a key factor that affects social 
transparency and thus mitigates legitimized thievery and rent-seeking.  Further work to shed lights 
on other factors that limit the players’ strategic options would be welcome.   
 Rigorous theoretical models of this political economy game are likely to run up against 
several difficulties.  For example, Rajan and Zingales (2003) mention an apparent time inconsistency 
in institutional change.  How should investors in a strong property rights institutional environment 
deal with the possibility that property rights might be weakened in the future?  Do investors buy 
stocks in emerging markets as ways of betting on those countries developing good institutions?  This 
might explain some of the findings of Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000).  But we have little real 
understanding of how stable property rights regimes are, and what contributes to their stability.  
 Also, because institutions evolve slowly, or in infrequent bursts of rapid change, we currently 
mostly rely on cross country studies.  As Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, Engerman, Sokoloff 
demonstrate, historical studies can be illuminating.  Assembling either cross country and historical 
data is labor intensive.  One way of mitigating this problem is for researchers to share their data 
where possible.  Another is to undertake detailed historical studies of individual countries’ 
institutions.  Yet another might be to conduct economic experiments to investigate the political 
economy of institutional development.  
 Finally, many of the studies discussed above – especially in this last section – use variables 
and concepts more commonly associated with anthropology, sociology, political science, or other 
social sciences than with economics and finance.  Yet borrowing from other fields might well help 
economists gain a deeper understanding of institutions, and of the extent to which they really are 
creatures of economics.   
 
V. Conclusion  
Economic growth appears to be related to the distribution of control over an economy’s corporate 
assets.  The literature reveals that outside of the United States and United Kingdom, most large 
corporations have controlling owners who are often very wealthy families.  Using pyramidal 
structures, cross shareholding, super voting rights, such a family typically controls many listed 
companies via a control pyramid.  Control pyramids drive a wedge between such families’ dominant 
control rights and their often miniscule actual investments in companies they control.   
 This separation apparently often leads to the simultaneous presence of two well known 
corporate governance problems: a divergence of the interests of the controlling shareholder from that 
of public shareholders and the entrenchment of the controlling shareholder.  The controlling owner 
can liberally utilize corporate resources they do not own to fund private benefits with no  fear of a 
shareholder revolt or hostile takeover.  By orchestrating intercorporate transactions at artificial 
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prices, the controlling owner can tunnel wealth between pyramid firms to generate greater private 
benefits.  The consequence is inefficient resource allocation at the firm level.   
 In many countries, large pyramidal groups effectively entrust the corporate governance of 
substantial parts of their corporate sectors to a few extremely wealthy families.  This can potentially 
magnify the poor governance of a few family patriarchs into inefficient economy-wide capital 
allocation, reduced investment in innovation, and retarded economic growth.  Moreover, to preserve 
the status quo, these elite families sometimes appear able to influence public policies so as to curtail 
private property rights development, capital market development and economic openness.  We dub 
this situation economic entrenchment.  We argue that much existing work points to economic 
entrenchment as a significant issue in many countries.  We then present a conceptual political 
economy framework that both defines economic entrenchment and conditions under which it can 
take hold.  
 While we develop our arguments in the context of wealthy families with extensive control 
pyramids, it is important to stress that the fundamental concept of entrenchment is more general.  
Tiny elites of professionals managers running keiretsu corporate groups in Japan, or of bureaucrats 
running state controlled pyramids in France, might also be entrenched.  The essential issue is the 
negative consequences for growth of entrusting an economy’s capital allocation to a tiny elite that 
cannot be sacked.   
Our literature survey also suggests several key issues.   
First, the archetypal corporate governance problem in the modern United States economy, a 
conflict between atomistic shareholders and professional managers does not generalize to most other 
countries.  Rather, large firms in most countries are typically organized into pyramidal groups 
controlled by a few wealthy families.  The ensuing corporate governance problem is conflict 
between the controlling shareholder of the pyramidal group and public shareholders.   
Second, the distribution of control over the corporate sector affects economic development.  
Such highly concentrated control over corporate assets plausibly leads to a range of market power 
distortions, especially in capital markets.  It also may curtail investment in innovation and augment 
rent-seeking.  All of these effects likely retard economic growth.   
Third, public policy regarding important issues like property rights, the development of 
financial markets and institutions, and economic openness, is usefully thought of as a political 
economy outcome.  From this perspective, “public policy” in many countries cannot be considered a 
discretionary variable that can be “adjusted” to cure economic ills.  Rather, it seems important to try 
to identify those factors that are “adjustable” and that might lead to a transition of the political 
economy from a suboptimal to a better equilibrium.  Further empirical and theoretical that clarifies 
these issues is likely to be of first order importance.   
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